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deregulation downstream. Deregulation tends to increase the level of uncertainty in the 
upstream market. Our theoretical analysis predicts that deregulated firms respond to this 
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restructuring of the electricity market in the U.S. as our case study, we find support for our 
theoretical predictions. Furthermore, we investigate the impact this change in procurement 
contracts has on efficiency. Focusing on coal mines, we find that those selling coal to plants 
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regulated plants. On the other hand, we also find that transaction costs may have increased as 
a consequence of deregulation. 
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Risk and Coal Procurement Contracts
1 Introduction
Firms operating in regulated markets, especially those working under cost-of-service regulation,
are often thought to be less efficient than firms operating under conditions of competition.
Competitive markets are in fact commonly viewed by economists as conducive to higher
technical efficiency. In most cases the argument relies on the notion that, in more competitive
environments, firms face stronger incentives for cost-minimization on the part of effort-averse
managers than would instead be the case in a regulated context (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
Moving from this intellectual premise, many economists advocate freer, more competitive
markets as the means to improve efficiency, reduce prices and increase welfare.
In one of the rare occasions in which policy-makers have eagerly applied the prescriptions
of economists, policy measures aimed at fostering competition have been commonplace in
OECD countries since at least the late 1970s. Especially frequent have been attempts to
deregulate previously regulated natural monopolies such as telecommunications, rail and
air transportation, water provision, and energy generation and distribution. Naturally,
economists interested in assessing the effects of competition have not missed the opportunity
to evaluate such policy changes (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Ng and Seabright, 2001; Syverson,
2004; Davis and Kilian, 2011, among others).
In this context, the restructuring of electricity markets has received special attention, due
to a combination of political salience and data availability (e.g. Newbery and Pollitt, 1997;
Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak, 2002; Malik, Cropper, Limonov, and Singh,
2011). Most contributions assessing the impact of deregulation in the electricity industry,
however, have to date taken a rather narrow view of the issues and discussed the consequences
of the policy exclusively from the point of view of firms operating directly in the deregulated
market (Borenstein et al., 2002; Bushnell and Wolfram, 2005; Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram,
2007; Zhang, 2007; Davis and Wolfram, 2012). Such analyses, while informative, provide
at best a partial picture of the overall consequences of deregulation. Abstracting from the
impacts of restructuring on the supply chain upstream from the deregulated market is a
relevant omission from a theoretical standpoint as the aim of the policy is to increase welfare
by eliminating all types of inefficiencies and transferring the associated rents to the final
consumers. This omission is also likely to be empirically relevant in all those situations where
the cost of specific inputs represents a significant share of the total costs of production, as
is true of fuel costs in coal-fired electricity generation, which contribute over 80% to total
variable costs (Cicala, 2014).
In this paper, we take a first step into investigating the consequences of regulation upwards
along the supply chain. To do this, we develop a theoretical model to analyze how deregulation
efforts impact the contracting process between electricity generators and coal mines. In
our efforts we are guided by the literature on procurement contracts in coal-fired electricity
generation mostly associated with the name of Paul Joskow. This literature identifies the key
dimensions along which long-term contracts are negotiated in the price adjustment mechanism
and the length of the contract (e.g., Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1988). Accordingly, we model the
choice of contracts in terms of the rigidity of the price setting mechanism and the contractual
duration. Our analysis focuses on the changes in the degree of uncertainty in the operating
environment for energy generators which ensue from the shift from cost-of-service regulation
to market competition. While previous work has noted that “firms that do not have the
security of a guaranteed rate of return on their investments will be more prudent in [...] the
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way they manage risk” (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000), no work to date has investigated the
impact of this increased uncertainty on procurement strategies. The key conclusions we derive
from our theoretical model are that one would expect to observe more rigid (e.g., fixed-price),
shorter contracts in restructured markets, as a consequence of risk-sharing attempts.The
second step in our analysis is to take these theoretical predictions to the data. The peculiar
history of deregulation in the United States presents us with the unique opportunity to
identify a suitable control group for the plants exogenously ‘treated’ with restructuring.1.
This enables us to identify the causal effects of restructuring on the deregulated plants. Using
data on actual contracts signed by U.S. coal-fired generators with coal mines over the period
1990-2001, we find that the data substantially support our theoretical insights. In the final
part of our work, we discuss the implications of our results for the overall efficiency of the
industry. On the one hand, contracts with more rigid price setting de facto make the coal
mine the residual claimant to any efficiency gain, and provide higher-powered incentives for
cost reductions. In this case, we would expect to observe increases in productivity in mines
that sell coal to deregulated plants, for example. Using data on labor productivity in the
mining industry, we conclude that more rigid pricing mechanisms in contracts are indeed
associated with productivity gains. On the other hand, we also note that shorter and more
rigid contracts imply higher transaction costs per unit of time, which in itself reduces the
overall level of efficiency. Our final empirical effort confirms that the changes in contracting
practices we identify can be linked to more frequent renegotiations, and to an ensuing increase
in transaction costs.
Our focus in this paper is on understanding how the contracting behaviour of electricity
generators adapts as the regulatory framework for the industry changes. We are particularly
interested in studying the impact of the increased exposure to risk experienced by electricity
generators once cost-of-service regulation is removed, and they find themselves operating in
a competitive market. In this new environment, far from being guaranteed the recovery of
(prudently incurred) costs and an appropriate rate of return as under cost-of-service regulation,
electricity generators are faced with volatile fuel prices and unpredictable (wholesale) electricity
prices. Thus, the attitudes to risk of both electricity generators and coal mines matter. While
a significant part of the literature seems to indicate that the empirical evidence supports a
risk neutrality assumption for contracting parties (e.g. Allen and Lueck, 1995), Ackerberg
and Botticini (2002) show that, once the endogenous nature of the match between the seller
and the buyer is accounted for, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that different
attitudes towards risk play a significant role in contract choices. This is likely to be especially
the case in an industry, such as coal-fired electricity generation, where the opportunity costs
for failing to produce are large2 and the transportation and storage costs for their bulky
input are substantial, with the consequent inflexibility of operation in the short-run. It seems
plausible, therefore, that producers operating in such an environment would be concerned
1As will be discussed in further detail below, restructuring was exogenous to coal contracting as states
restructured due to lack of relatively cheap hydroelectric generation opportunities and/or sunk, irreversible
generation investments from the 1970s and 80s (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000)
2It is generally understood that the state and electricity utilities had a “regulatory compact” where
consumers accepted a monopolist provider and the utility accepted an obligation to produce (McDermott,
2012).
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not only with the expected returns of their decisions, but also with the associated risks.3,4
With this in mind, we adopt the classical Markowitz (1952, 1991) framework, and model the
choice of contract similarly to a problem of portfolio selection. In our case the value of a
contract can be expressed as a function of its expected returns (i.e. the profits associated
with it), and its riskiness. Rather than resorting to traditional proxies for risk such as the
variance, however, we build on current practice in the financial literature and use the concept
of Conditional Value at Risk to capture the risk associated with a contract (Rockafellar and
Uryasev, 2000; Yamai and Yoshiba, 2005).
Our work is in the spirit of the seminal contribution by Cheung (1969), as we explicitly
study the trade-off between transaction costs and risk distribution between contracting
parties associated with different contractual arrangements, and it is also related to the vast
literature on procurement contracts.5 Among the many theoretical contributions on optimal
procurement contracts and asymmetric information, our paper is closest to those that study
moral hazard in procurement. McAfee and McMillan (1986) is a classic reference in this
respect. There the optimal contract offered by the buyer to the risk averse seller implements
a partial reimbursement rule that trades off incentives for cost reduction effort and the need
to share risk. Similarly, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) focus on the trade-off between the cost
reduction incentives and ex-post renegotiation inefficiencies. Like these authors, we adopt
a transaction cost approach to model the exposure to risk. In our framework the optimal
contract balances the cost on contracting against the exposure to upstream uncertainty/risk
(from the fuel price), by determining the optimal degree of price rigidity specified in the
contract.
Due to data limitations, the empirical contract literature has lagged somewhat behind its
theoretical counterpart.6 Nevertheless, several authors have investigated the determinants
of contract choice using different proxies for the characteristics of the principal, the agent
and the task being contracted. Allen and Lueck (1992), Laffont and Matoussi (1995), and
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) focus on the determinants of agrarian contracts, Leﬄer and
Rucker (1991) look at timber harvesting, while Martin (1988), Lafontaine (1991), and Slade
(1996) discuss contract choice in business franchising. Closer to our work, Corts and Singh
(2004) study the impact of repeated interaction on the choice of fixed-price versus cost-plus
contracts in the offshore drilling industry, while Joskow (1987), Kerkvliet and Shogren (2001)
and Kozhevnikova and Lange (2009) look specifically at the determinants of contractual
3In moving away from risk-neutrality, we follow a number of very influential contributions dealing with
firms operating under price uncertainty. Seminal contributions in this context are Baron (1970); Sandmo
(1971); Holthausen (1979).
4In principle, a variety of financial instruments – forward contracts, futures contracts, options, etc. – are
available to generators to hedge those risks. In practice, however, given the limited possibility to efficiently
store electricity, the severe constraints that exist on its transmission (both in physical terms and in terms
of reliability), and the inelastic nature of (short-run) electricity demand, electricity prices on deregulated
wholesale markets are substantially more volatile than any other commodity price (e.g. Liu, Wu, and Ni,
2006; Yu, Somani, and Tesfatsion, 2010), thus making effective hedging much more difficult. As refers to
input prices, Gross, Blyrth, and Heptonstall (2010) discuss the difficulty of hedging against long-run fuel price
uncertainty. As a result, electricity generators need to accept the impossibility of perfectly hedging against
the types of risk mentioned above. In this sense, our analysis can be seen as a study of how the residual risk
(after hedging) coming from both the downstream wholesale electricity price volatility, and upstream fuel price
uncertainty shapes the optimal contractual arrangements on the upstream market.
5Che (2008) provides an excellent overview of the standard economic models of optimal procurement
in markets with limited information. The literature review in Asker and Cantillon (2010) provides a more
comprehensive list of publications in this literature.
6For two recent surveys of this literature see Chiappori and Salanie´ (2002), and Corts and Singh (2004).
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duration in coal procurement using U.S. data. In the present paper, we study the interaction
between the price rigidity decision and the length of the contract, explicitly modelling the
two decisions as simultaneously chosen characteristics of the optimal contract.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows, section 2 provides a concise overview of the market
for coal in the U.S. in the period covered by our analysis and discusses the restructuring process
started in the early 1990s. Section 3 contains our theoretical discussion and concludes with
the testable implications that we take to the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy,
describes the data and discusses the results. In section 5 we discuss the implications of our
theoretical and empirical analysis in terms of mine productivity and contract renegotiation.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 An overview of procurement choices in the coal-fired gen-
eration industry in the U.S.
Our analysis focuses on the period between 1990 and 2001. This period corresponds to the
peak of coal usage in the U.S. electricity market, as the oil embargoes of the 1970s created
the conditions for an expansion in coal-fired electricity generation capacity. Coal supplied
around 50% of the U.S. electricity through the 1980s, 1990s, and the early 2000s (U.S. EIA,
2010). Since coal plants tend to have higher start-up and shut-down costs, relative to oil
and gas plants, coal capacity was generally built to supply the base-load of the electricity
system, meaning that it was expected to run at all hours of the day, whereas oil and gas
would only run for shorter periods. Hence, the main operational concern for operators of
coal-fired boilers was to ensure an adequate and consistent supply of coal to meet base-load
electricity demand. This led plants to utilize complex long-term forward contracts for fuel
procurement. Different types of contracts were developed, with varying degree of price rigidity.
At one end of the spectrum one finds ‘fixed-price’ contracts, which would specify a single
delivery price for the entire duration of the contract; at the other end of the spectrum,
instead, the so-called ‘evergreen’ contracts stipulated that the price would be renegotiated at
predetermined intervals, usually once a year. Other contracts had intermediate degrees of
price rigidity, such as contracts that would specify a base price and a formula to compute
increases or decreases from this base price, depending on economic and market conditions
(‘base-price plus escalation’ contracts).7
These contracts proved to be surprisingly resilient to changes in input market regulation such
as railroad market restructuring, and the emergence of a large spot market in the Western
coal producing states (Joskow, 1985, 1990).
The desire for quantity/quality certainty, and the associated use of long-term forward contracts,
was re-enforced by the structure of economic regulation in the electricity sector. Plants were
regulated under a cost-of-service regulation, where the price of electricity was guaranteed
by the state, depending on the plant’s cost of generation. Crucially, once the state public
utility commissions (PUCs) approved a coal contract, they would then allow the plant to
be compensated for the prices paid under that contract. The regulator put large weight
on ensuring supply would meet demand, rather than focusing on the cost of electricity.
7Table 1 summarizes the most common types of contracts and the definition provided by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to plants in the survey’s documentation
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Moreover, most plants were part of an integrated utility that also managed the transmission
and distribution grids, so they had a great deal of certainty with respect to both the price
and quantity of the electricity they would sell. In this situation, it was very difficult for new
entrants to gain access to the market, given that the incumbents managed the grid. This
state of affairs considerably reduced the generators’ incentives to minimize their generation
costs, and left the mines with little pressure to improve their efficiency.
In 1992, the federal Energy Policy Act mandated that non-discriminatory access to the
transmission grid be guaranteed, in an effort to encourage new generators to enter the market.
Many states were also interested in encouraging lower cost generators to enter the generation
market, and thus held hearings on how to reform their regulation of the electricity market.
These hearings addressed possible ways to bring competition to the generation of electricity
through potential legislation that separated transmission and distribution services from
the generation and retail services of the electricity market. States that went through with
electricity market restructuring set up a market where plants generally had to bid for the right
to put electricity onto the transmission system and thus sell their output. Table 2 gives a list
of the years when hearings were held and restructuring legislation passed, by state. Compared
to the economic regulation that had existed before the mid-1990s, restructured electricity
markets introduced risk in the output market for electricity generators. Whereas electricity
generators in regulated markets were only marginally concerned by price uncertainty, in
restructured markets little guarantee existed as to either price or quantity. In the next section
we present a theoretical model to analyze how this change in uncertainty might have affected
the choice of contract in the negotiation between electricity generators and coal mines.
3 A model of fuel procurement in electricity generation
Our goal is to model the interaction between a coal-fired electricity generator and a coal mine,
with the specific goal of understanding how changes in the regulatory environment downstream,
i.e. on the wholesale electricity market, might affect the behaviour of the parties.8 The
electricity producer needs to source coal to produce steam to generate electricity for sale on
the downstream market. The mine, on the other hand, extracts coal from the ground and
sells it.9 This interaction may result in the parties writing long-term procurement contracts
for the delivery of coal from the mine to the generator (e.g. Joskow, 1985).
3.1 The value of a contract
While coal contracts can be very complex, for our purposes here it suffices to focus on two
elements of the procurement contract, namely the price paid for each unit of coal, pc, and the
duration, d, of the contract itself. We simplify our analysis by assuming that the quantity of
coal contracted for delivery is given and can be normalized to one.10 Furthermore, building
8In what follows we use the terms ‘producer’, ‘generator’, ‘buyer’ or simply ‘plant’ interchangeably. Instead,
we refer to the coal producer as the ‘mine’, or simply the ‘seller’.
9Between 1990 and 2001, on average 92% of all coal mined in the United States was used to generate
electricity. Thus, neglecting alternative uses of mined coal is unlikely to be a significant omission in this
context.
10Most coal-fired generators served as base-load generation during our sample given their low marginal
cost of generation, and their high cost of ramping production up or down. Hence, such generators produce
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on the insights provided by Crio and Condren (1984) and Kerkvliet and Shogren (1992), we
treat all aspects of the contract that refers to the quality of coal as exogenous.11
As regards the price of coal, the contract needs to specify how it is to be determined over
the whole duration of the contract. Different price adjustment provisions may be included in
procurement contracts (see e.g., Joskow, 1988). The price can be fixed for the whole duration
of the contract, which leads to the aptly named fixed-price contract, for example. It can,
however, be allowed to change over time, for example to compensate – partially or totally –
the mine for unexpected changes in the level of its costs, or to reflect changes in economic
conditions. To capture the varying degree to which the price of coal is linked to the mining
costs, we can write the delivery price of coal as the sum of a component that allows the seller
to recoup its operating costs, (1− r)x(χ, e), and a fixed part that allows for an appropriate
rate of return on its assets, δ(r). In this way the degree of rigidity of the pricing mechanism
is completely captured by the value of r:
pc = (1− r)x(χ, e) + δ(r). (1)
In the expression above x(χ, e) represents the production costs incurred by the mine.12 These
costs are uncertain and depend on the physical properties of the coal seam, as well as other
characteristics such as the degree of unionization of the labour force. To capture the idea that
these costs vary across locations, we assume that mining costs depend positively on a random
variable, χ, whose probability distribution is known to the mine, but whose actual realization
is not known at the time the contract is written. The mine may, however, affect the level of
its mining costs by exerting effort, e ≥ 0, for example in order to increase its productivity.
Effort is costly, and the cost of effort, g(e), is increasing and convex, i.e. g(0) = 0, with g′ > 0,
and g′′ ≥ 0. We also assume that these private costs are unobservable by the generator.13
For the sake of analytical tractability it turns out to be convenient to assume that x(χ, e)
is normally distributed with mean E(x) and variance σ2x. In line with the moral hazard
literature, we assume that effort may reduce the expected level of costs, but becomes gradually
less effective. Formally, we let ∂E(x)/∂e < 0 and ∂2E(x)/∂e2 ≥ 0. At least in principle,
however, effort might also affect the variance of the mining costs. One could imagine, for
example, that cost-reducing efforts could be aimed at reducing administrative costs with
little effect on actual production activities. In this case cost-reducing effort would not affect
the variance of costs, and ∂σ2x/∂e = 0. This is equivalent to saying that, for any effort
levels e < e′, x(χ, e) first order stochastically dominates x(χ, e′). On the other hand, as we
will further elaborate in the next section, both the mine and the generator value certainty.
Thus, cost-reducing effort could be directly aimed at reducing the variance of production
costs. This could be achieved, for example, by prioritizing the development of shallower
continuously and their main concern in terms of procurement is the availability of a sufficient quantity of coal.
In this market segment, then, the quantity of coal to be delivered each period is very closely related to the
productive capacity of the electricity generator, and can be considered constant.
11Crio and Condren (1984) and Kerkvliet and Shogren (1992) remark that long term contracts specify the
physical attributes of the coal in order to match the design specifications of the boilers. Hence, the physical
attributes specified in the contract (usually the heat, sulfur, ash, and moisture content) are a function of the
technical characteristics of the boiler, and as such are exogenous to the choice of contract.
12The mine’s main activity is to extract coal from the ground. This is a complex process, which typically
entails drilling and blasting the coal seam, removing the coal, crushing and separating the coal from other
by-products, stockpiling and shipping.
13Notice that in this context contracting on the degree of price rigidity is equivalent to contracting on
effort, given the monotonic relationship between effort and rigidity. This is formally shown in Lemma 1 below.
7
Risk and Coal Procurement Contracts
seams or continuous production scheduling. In such cases, we would expect that ∂σ2x/∂e < 0.
Finally, as recently shown by Buessing and Weil (2014), certain types of efforts targeted
at reducing the level of costs in mining could have as unintended consequence an increase
in the probability of injuries or fatalities. This would imply an increase in the variance of
extraction costs. Hence, it is also plausible that ∂σ2x/∂e > 0. Our framework nests all these
three alternative scenarios.
As discussed in Section 2, several types of contracts have long coexisted in this industry. To
allow for this possibility in our theoretical model, we need to impose that the level of the price
of coal be the same, ex-ante, across contracts. In order for this to happen, we need to adjust
the level of the fixed component such that the expected price remains the same, irrespective
of the degree of contractual price rigidity. It follows that δ becomes an increasing function of
r. To see this, consider first a fixed price contract where no cost recovery is allowed. In this
case r = 1 and pc = δ(1) = δ. For the ex-ante price of coal to be the same across contracts
with different degrees of price rigidity, it must hold that E(pc) = δ(r) + (1− r)E(x) = δ, or,
equivalently, that:
δ(r) = δ − (1− r)E(x). (2)
In line with the theoretical underpinnings of the transaction cost approach to contracting
(Coase, 1937; Cheung, 1969; Williamson, 1985), we assume that for both sellers and buyers
negotiating an agreement, writing the relative contract, and managing the ensuing relationship
with the counterpart entails potentially large costs, including the opportunity cost of devoting
resources to contracting and administering the contract, rather than to alternative, more
productive activities. We also assume, as discussed at length below, that different types of
contracts entail different transaction costs, depending on the contract rigidity, and its duration.
Quite naturally, we assume that more complex relationships – in particular those that require
higher level of relation-specific assets – are generally more costly to shape and maintain
(Joskow, 1987). Crucially, we assume that these costs cannot be practically attributed to
specific accounting posts and that, as a consequence, they cannot be included in the costs
that can be recovered under a cost-plus contract by the seller, and under cost-of-service
regulation by the buyer. In other words, transaction costs always contribute negatively to
profits, irrespective of the regulatory environment and the pricing mechanism.
Given (1), we can parameterize the price setting mechanism by r, and define a ‘contract’ as a
pair, γ = (r, d). From the set of all possible contracts, Γ, the parties will select the contract
γ that maximizes the benefits they derive from the contractual relationship. Similarly to
the familiar Markowitz (1952) set-up, we assume that both types of agents value contracts
according to their perceived trade-off between risk and expected return. In line with recent
practice in the financial contracting literature, however, rather than measuring risk using the
variance of the portfolio returns, we adopt the concept of conditional-value-at-risk (CV aRα)
as our proxy for risk (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000).14 As a consequence, both types of
14For any given confidence level α, the value-at-risk, or V aRα, of a portfolio is given by the smallest
number v such that the probability that the loss in portfolio value exceeds v is not greater than (1− α). The
CV aRα of a portfolio is, instead, defined as the expected loss in portfolio value during a specified period,
conditional on the event that the loss is greater than or equal to V aRα. Thus, CV aRα informs a portfolio
holder about the size of the expected loss, conditional on the occurrence of an unfavorable event, rather than
simply indicating the probability of an unfavorable event (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000). A rich literature
exists, which discusses the relative merits of CV aRα and V aRα. For a comprehensive discussion, the reader
is referred to Yamai and Yoshiba (2005). For examples of papers using CV aRα in the context of electricity
markets, see Liu et al. (2006) and Yu et al. (2010).
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firm choose the contract that provides the best combination of expected profits and the size
of the potential adverse consequences associated with the contract. The per-period value of
contract γ = (r, d) to firm type i = {g,m}, can thus be written in general terms as follows:
V i(γ) = E(pii)− θiCV aRα(−pii), for i = {g,m}, (3)
where g and m are the generator’s and the mine’s identifiers, respectively, and θi is the
relative weight attached to risk by type i in its objective function.
3.2 The mine
We start by specializing (3) for the case of the coal mine. Having extracted and processed the
coal, the mine delivers it to the generator in exchange for the agreed price, pc. Taking into
account that the mine incurs production costs, x(χ, e), effort costs, g(e), and – as discussed
above – transaction costs, km, we can write the mine’s profits as
pim = pc − x(χ, e)− g(e)− km(r, d ;A). (4)
Our assumptions regarding the transaction cost component km, which are derived from the
literature and from our understanding of the industry, warrant some discussion. First of all,
building on the large existing literature on contract completeness, it is quite natural to think
that the transaction costs km would change with the pricing mechanism, and the duration
of contract being stipulated (e.g. Tadelis and Williamson, 2012). On the one hand, a more
rigid contract may be more costly to negotiate, as there are simply more contingencies to
contemplate (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001); on the other hand, a contract that specifies the
price more rigidly – such as a fixed-price contract – would reduce the level of effort exerted
by the mine in accounting for, documenting and reporting its operating costs. As such, it
entails lower administrative costs for the seller (Joskow, 1985). In what follows, we assume
that the latter effect is particularly important from the point of view of the mine, and thus
assume that km is decreasing with r, i.e. we let ∂km/∂r < 0. As refers to the duration
stipulated in the contract, instead, one would normally believe that a longer contract would
allow for the fixed stipulation costs to be spread over a longer time period, and hence reduce
the per-period administrative costs. One needs to consider, however, that the longer the
contract duration specified in the contract, the higher the probability that the seller might
find it advantageous to breach the existing contract. This tendency might be driven by the
desire to pursue more lucrative alternative opportunities elsewhere – a situation discussed, for
example, by Joskow (1988) – or might arise because of negative developments in productive
conditions. As discussed in section 2 above, coal procurement contracts specify in great
detail the characteristics of the coal to be delivered, for example its heat, ash, moisture and
sulfur contents. If the productive conditions of the mine change – because of an unexpected
deterioration in the quality of the coal they extract, for example – the mine might find it very
costly to keep operating within the framework of its current contractual obligations, and might
prefer to breach the contract. Either way, breaching the contract adds more transaction costs
and potentially large litigation costs to the total. With all this in mind, we conclude that km is
likely to be increasing with contractual duration, d, i.e. ∂km/∂d > 0. In what follows we also
assume that transaction costs are strictly convex in both arguments, so that ∂2km/∂x2 > 0,
for x ∈ {r, d}. Since the likelihood of breach of contract is particularly high for contracts with
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more rigid price setting mechanisms, we further assume that ∂2km/(∂r∂d) > 0.15 Finally,
the type of transaction costs discussed above may be affected by other factors, among which
relation-specific investments feature prominently, as discussed by Joskow (1987). To reflect
this possibility, we write the transaction cost component as km(r, d ;A), where A is a vector
of cost-shifters. The need to incur relation-specific investments tends to increase the cost of
entering the contractual relationship; at the same time, the presence of relation-specific assets
is likely to reduce the attractiveness of alternative opportunities. Both arguments imply that
a longer contractual duration becomes more desirable as the sunk costs may be spread over
more periods, and the likelihood of breaching the contract is reduced.16 This reasoning leads
us to conclude that the marginal costs of a longer contractual duration decrease with A, i.e.
∂2km/(∂d ∂Ai) < 0 for each component Ai of A.
17
Substituting (1) into (4), and given our assumption that mining costs are distributed according
to N(E(x), σ2x), we can express the value to the mine of entering into contract γ with the
buyer as follows:
V m(γ, e) = (1 + θm)
[
δ − E(x(χ, e))− km(r, d ;A)− g(e)
]
− θmb(α)rσx, (5)
where we made use of the fact that, as shown by Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000), for normally
distributed portfolios the conditional value at risk can be written as
CV aRα(−pi) = −E(pi) + b(α)
√
Var(pi), (6)
where
b(α) = (
√
2pi exp(erf−1(2α− 1))2(1− α))−1,
and erf(z) = (2/
√
pi)
∫ z
o exp(−s2)ds is the Gauss error function.
From (5) it follows that for any given contract γ = (r, d) the mine would optimally choose its
level of effort, to maximise its benefits from the contract. It turns out, however, that the
decisions on the optimal degree price rigidity and on the optimal level of effort are intimately
related. In fact, we can show that it is possible to fully characterize the optimal choice of
effort as a function of the degree of price rigidity only, as emerges from the statement below:
Lemma 1. Given equation (5) and any exogenous contact γ = (r, d), the mine’s optimal
choice of effort, e∗, is a monotonic function of the level of rigidity r. Moreover, e∗(r) is an
increasing function, provided that
(1 + θm)
∂E(x)
∂e
+ θmb(α)
∂σx
∂e
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
15In this respect, Joskow (1988) writes “While almost any price-adjustment provision could lead to large
disparities between contract prices and “market prices” if certain contingencies arise, and thereby provide
incentives for either the buyer or the seller to breach, a fixed-price contract almost guarantees that these
problems will arise”.
16Joskow (1985) concludes that “The empirical results [. . .] provided strong support for the hypothesis that
buyers and sellers make longer ex ante commitments to the terms of future trade, and rely less on repeated
negotiations over time, when relationship-specific investments are more important”.
17Since we have no priors about the impact of changes in relation-specific investments on the degree of
rigidity of the pricing mechanism, nor could we think of a mechanism through which a change in A would
directly affect the cost of r, in what follows we assume ∂2km/(∂r∂A) = 0.
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The implications of this results are clear, as long as effort is “worth it”18, contracts with less
flexible price provisions introduce higher powered incentives for cost-reduction by making the
mine the residual claimant of any efficiency gain.
It directly follows from Lemma 1 that in the remainder of the paper, it will suffice to
concentrate on the choice of contractual rigidity, while the optimal level of effort will be a
direct consequence of the choice of r. Accordingly, with a slight abuse of notation, from now
on we let V m(γ) ≡ V m(γ, e∗(γ)).
3.3 The electricity generator
To derive the expression that represents the value of the contract from the point of view of
the electricity producer, we first need to consider the determinants of the generator’s profits.
Obviously, the generator derives revenues from the sale of electricity, which may occur either
on a regulated or a liberalized market. When the generator operates within a regulated
market, the unit price of electricity (pe) is set by the regulator to cover the firm’s operating
costs (c) and allow for a fair rate of return on its assets. In this case, we can write pe = µ+ c,
where µ represents the unitary mark-up over costs recognized by the regulator.19 When the
generator sells electricity on a liberalized market, it instead faces a competitive environment,
and takes the price of electricity as exogenously given. Since the price of electricity is ex-ante
unknown, this introduces uncertainty in the generator’s objective function. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that pe is normally distributed with mean E(pe), and standard
deviation σe.
To generate electricity, the producer naturally incurs costs. In this simplified set-up, we focus
purely on fuel costs and abstract from all remaining operating costs. This assumption allows
us to transparently bring to the fore the role of input-cost risk, as in this context c simply
equals pc, the price of one unit of coal.20
As in the case of the coal mine, in addition to these operating costs, we include in the profit
expression the transaction costs, kg, associated with bargaining, contracting, and managing
the relationship with the counterpart. We assume that kg is increasing with the degree of
price rigidity as writing a more rigid contract is more costly and, contrary to the seller, the
generator doesn’t save on administrative costs by being in a more rigid contract. Thus, we
have ∂kg/∂r > 0. Furthermore, we assume that from the point of view of the generator the
cost of contracting declines with the duration of the contract. Trivially in this case the costs
18The condition presented in Lemma 1 is readily interpreted as an “effectiveness condition” on effort.
Given that from the point of view of the mine both a higher expected level and a higher variance of the costs
represent negative attributes, the requirement that the marginal effect of effort on the weighted sum of the
expected cost level and variance be negative is in effect just saying that effort should be effective in reducing
the negative impact of x (and σ2x) on the maximand in (5). Naturally, the weighting depends both on the
mine’s preference parameter for risk avoidance, θ, and on the level of its risk tolerance α.
19Note that to simplify the notation, we have chosen our measurement units such that one unit of electricity
is produced with one unit of coal.
20Elsewhere in the literature, the role of capital investments features prominently. Most recently, Fowlie
(2010) discusses the possibility that firms’ choices of compliance options in the NOx Budget Program were
driven by the difference in capital cost recovery possibilities between restructured and regulated electricity
markets. In the context of the present paper, however, capital investment is not a crucial determinant of the
contractual behaviour of generators vis a` vis coal mines. As a consequence, we abstract from this aspect in
our theoretical discussion. We return to this topic when we discuss the empirical results in the second part of
the paper.
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are incurred less frequently so the per-period cost decreases, and the generator does not face
the costs discussed above for the mine, that arise from the expected breach of contract, so
that ∂kg/∂d < 0.21 As discussed in the previous section, however, we want to allow for the
possibility that the transaction costs discussed here might depend on a set of cost shifters,
A. In this case, an increase in A – for example an increase in transaction-specific assets
– further reduces the marginal cost of a the contractual duration. Thus, kg(r, d ;A), and
∂2kg/(∂d ∂Ai) < 0, for each Ai ∈ A.22
If we let λ = {0, 1} be an indicator of the regulatory context, which assumes the value 1 in a
restructured market and 0 otherwise, we can concisely write the expression for profits for the
generator across regulatory regimes, as follows:
pig = λpe + (1− λ)(µ+ pc)− pc − kg(r, d ;A), for λ = {0, 1}. (7)
This implies that, from the point of view of the generator, the value of signing up to contract
γ = (r, d) is:
V g(γ) = (1 + θg)
{
λ
[
E(pe)− δ − µ]+ µ− kg(r, d ;A)}− θgb(α)λ√σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x. (8)
In the expression above, we have once again made use of the normality assumption for both
pe and x to write the conditional value at risk as a function of the expected value and the
standard deviation of the profit expression only, according to equation (6).
3.4 The optimal choice of contract
We assume that there is a large number of potential sellers (mines) on the market relative to
the number of buyers (generators), so that we let the buyer make a take it or leave it offer to
the seller, offering a contract that guarantees the mine a value of zero.23 With this assumption
in mind, the problem of the generator reduces to the problem of selecting from the menu of
all contracts, Γ, the one that maximizes its objective function, (8), while guaranteeing the
participation of the mine. Formally, the generator chooses the contract γ∗ = (r∗, d∗) that
solves
γ∗ ≡ arg max
γ∈Γ
= {V g(γ)|V m(γ)) ≥ 0}. (9)
We are now in a position to derive our first result, which refers to the impact of deregulation
in the downstream market on the characteristics of the optimal contract:
Proposition 1. The degree of price rigidity specified by the optimal contract, r∗, is mono-
tonically non-decreasing in the degree of market liberalization, λ, while the optimal duration
21This is because the generator has lower incentives to breach the contract than the mine, and it most
likely would be on the receiving end of any compensation in case of breach of contract by the mine.
22Notice that as in the case of the mine, we assume that changes in A do not affect the marginal transaction
cost of a more rigid contract, i.e. ∂2kg/(∂d ∂Ai) = 0.
23This assumption is made here for the sake of simplicity, and while this implies that the generator is able
to extract all the rents, this is without loss of generality in terms of the results of Proposition 1 and 2. In fact,
any other non-cooperative bargaining procedure that reallocates rents differently would imply qualitatively
similar results. To see that this is indeed the case, consider the other polar case that assigns the role of
proposer of the TIOLI offer to the mine. While this implies reversing roles in problem (9), it does not change
the sign of any of the derivatives in Appendix B and C. As a consequence, our monotone comparative statics
results go through without amendments.
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of the contract, d∗, is monotonically non-increasing in λ.
Proof. See Appendix B
According to this result, as the downstream market gets deregulated the generator finds
it more profitable to offer contracts characterized by an increasing degree of price rigidity
and/or a shorter duration to its coal provider. The result accords with our intuition. In a
regulated market, the cost-of-service regulation faced by the generator de facto insulates it
from any adverse realization of the mining cost variable, x(χ, e). Hence, in this context the
generator only needs to pick the right combination of price rigidity and duration to minimize
its transaction costs while at the same time ensuring the continued participation of the mine
in the exchange. As the market gets liberalized (i.e. when λ = 1), however, the generator
is left facing the prospect of potential losses via the uncertainty associated with the now
variable market price for its output, and the oscillation in the cost of its input – see the last
term in equation (8). Since the electricity market is perfectly competitive by assumption,
the only option left to the generator to reduce its exposure to risk is to limit the uncertainty
associated with the price of coal. To achieve this, the generator offers the mine a contract
with a higher degree of price rigidity which limits the negative consequences in terms of
profits of a bad realization of χ. In doing so, however, it is the turn of the mine to become
more exposed to the same bad outcome. To satisfy the mine’s participation constraint, the
buyer needs to offer a shorter contractual duration, which reduces the cost of contracting for
the mine, and makes the new contract more palatable.
The previous discussion underlines the fundamental tension that emerges from the point of
view of the buyer, following the restructuring of the downstream market. In a restructured
market, the electricity generator wishes to reduce its exposure to risk, but is not willing to
incur excessive transaction costs, and at the same time she needs to satisfy the participation
constraint for the mine. Thus, it accords with our intuition that the optimal choice of
procurement contract may change with the overall level of risk, and with the relative
costliness of the two instruments, r and d, in terms of transaction costs, as is shown in the
following result:
Proposition 2. The sign of the derivative of the optimal choice of contract rigidity and
duration with respect to changes in the values of key parameters are as follows:
Choice variable
Parameter r∗ d∗
Ai ≤ 0 ≥ 0
σ2e ≤ 0 ≥ 0
σ2x ? ≥ 0
Proof. See Appendix C
The first line of the table in Proposition 2 informs us that an increase in any of the transaction
cost-shifters, Ai, reduces r and increases d. Clearly, since more relation-specific assets reduce
the transaction costs associated with a longer contract, longer, less rigid contracts will
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naturally emerge from situations where sunk costs of this type are more pervasive, e.g. for
mine-mouth plants-mine relationships (See the discussion in Joskow, 1987, for example). The
mechanism at work here is also interesting as it will help us in our identification efforts in the
empirical part of the paper. Given our theoretical model, the lengthening of the contractual
duration is directly caused by the change in the relation-specific assets. The change in the
pricing mechanism, instead, only emerges indirectly, by virtue of the strict convexity of the
transaction cost functions.
Next, we turn to the consequences of an increase in risk, proxied by the volatility of the price
of electricity, and the variance of the extraction costs. Since the CV aR component of V g is
increasing in both σ2e and σ
2
x, it is evident that operating in a more uncertain environment
carries the risk of higher losses for the generator. We start from an increase in the volatility of
the price of electricity, which is relatively more straightforward to analyze. Firstly, notice that
the generator does not have any instrument to insulate herself from an increase in σ2e . An
increase in σ2e , moreover, decreases, at the margin, the effectiveness of r in reducing CV aR.
Indeed, the impact on CV aR of an increase in the rigidity of the price setting mechanism
is smaller, the more volatile the electricity prices (see Appendix C). It follows that, from
the point of view of the generator, an increase in r is not attractive in this context, since
the higher transaction costs associated with more rigid contracts are no longer compensated
by a sufficient reduction in CV aR. The generator will therefore prefer less rigid contracts,
compared to what is optimal in a low-σ2e environment. Further, recall that value of the
contract for the generator, V g, is increasing with contract duration, d. Thus, ceteris paribus,
a generator would also prefer longer contracts. Let us now consider this issue from the point
of view of the mine. We know that V m is decreasing with d, and may also be decreasing with
r. This implies that to satisfy the mine’s participation constraint while offering more flexible
contract, the buyer may also choose to offer a longer contract, provided that indeed V m is
decreasing in r. In this case the mine would be indifferent between the “high-volatility” less
rigid, but longer contract, and the “low-volatility” more rigid, shorter contracts.
An increase in the dispersion of the extraction costs, σ2x, has less a clear-cut effect on the
characteristics of the optimal contract. On the one hand, from the point of view of the
generator a higher level of σ2x implies higher CV aR. Thus, the generator may want to shelter
from the increase in riskiness upstream by offering a more rigid contract to the mine. This is
clearly the case, when the mine attaches no weight to risk in its objective function, i.e. when
θm = 0. Furthermore, if the value of the contract for the mine, V m, is increasing in rigidity,
r, the generator can satisfy the mine’s participation constraint and offer a longer contract,
which reduces her transaction costs. If, on the other hand, the mine attaches a positive
value on risk in its objective function (i.e., θm > 0), the generator needs to accommodate the
tightening of the mine’s participation constraint in equation (9), as the value of the contract
for the mine unequivocally falls with σx. In this case, the effect of an increase in σ
2
x on the
optimal level of rigidity is ambiguous as it depends on whether the contract value for the
mine is increasing or decreasing in r. It is, however, clear that this will never result in a
contract with shorter duration, as this would results in a further tightening of the mine’s
participation constraint.
Similar to the case discussed above for changes in relation-specific assets, it is important
to note here that changes in the level of risk exposure affect directly the optimal level of
r, whereas the choice of contractual duration is only indirectly affected. We return to this
property of the model when we discuss the strategy for empirical identification below.
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3.5 Taking the theory to the data.
The theoretical discussion presented so far provides several insights into the contracting
behaviour of generators and coal mines. The key results, as summarized in Proposition 1,
immediately lead us to formulate the main testable hypotheses that we are going to subject
to empirical scrutiny in the next part of this paper. As refers to the degree of price rigidity,
we can state the following:
Hypothesis 1. The degree of rigidity of the price-setting mechanism specified in the contract
should not be lower, ceteris paribus, for contracts signed by electricity generators operating in
restructured markets than for generators operating in non-restructured ones.
Its counterpart in terms of contract duration is:
Hypothesis 2. The duration specified in the contract should not be longer, ceteris paribus,
for contracts signed by utilities operating in restructured markets than for utilities operating
in non-restructured ones.
Thus, we would expect the electricity market restructuring to lead to more rigid and shorter
contracts. As we know from Lemma 1, however, under appropriate conditions, an increase
in rigidity should lead to an increase in the optimal level of cost-reducing effort exerted by
mines. This brings us to the following implication of our theoretical model:
Hypothesis 3. Following restructuring, mines that sell coal to plants in restructured states
should become more efficient relative to mines that do not.
One final implication of our theoretical framework emerges once we focus again on the
incentives for contract breach that emerge from adverse realization of the mining cost variable.
In section 3.2 we argued that such incentives are particularly strong when contracts are more
rigid. We could then expect that an increase in contractual rigidity would lead to an increase
in the frequency of contract breaches and of renegotiations.
Hypothesis 4. The frequency of contract renegotiations should be increasing with the rigidity
of the contractual pricing mechanism.
This latter implication has, as a corollary, that following restructuring we should observe an
increase in transaction costs in then market for coal.
4 An empirical investigation of contract choices
In the rest of the paper, we confront the implications of our theoretical analysis spelled
out above with data. The first step is obviously to assess the impact of electricity market
restructuring on the optimal choice of procurement contracts. Three aspects of this empirical
endeavour are worth noting here: Firstly, and crucially for our empirical endeavour, the
variation over time and across U.S. states of restructuring of electricity markets gives us
the possibility to cast our analysis as a quasi-experiment with plants operating in regulated
states acting as the control group against which to assess the behaviour of plants operating
in states that have undergone restructuring. In this context, we are able to causally attribute
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the differences in contracting behaviour between treated and control plants to restructuring.
Secondly, the theoretical discussion above emphasizes that the optimal contract choice entails
a simultaneous decision in terms of price rigidity and duration of the procurement contract,
whereas the available data only captures the observed equilibrium outcomes of the contracting
process between plants and mines. This obviously leads to concerns about the existence
of endogeneity and the related biases in the coefficient estimates of our empirical model.
In order to correct for such potential biases, an instrumental variable (IV) approach can
be utilized, and instruments for both rigidity and duration need to be employed. Finally,
according to our theoretical results, the choice of contractual rigidity and duration depends –
among other things – on the riskiness of the operating environment for the generators, i.e. on
σ2e , and on the volatility of coal production costs, σ
2
x. Both of these variables are not directly
observed in our data and can only be proxy-ed with error. In the spirit of Ackerberg and
Botticini (2002), this state of affairs raises concerns about the possibility that, in the presence
of endogenous matching between plants and mines, this measurement errors might results in
residual correlation between the proxies and the error terms in our regressions, potentially
leading to biases in the estimated coefficients. To control for this possibility, we can augment
our empirical procedures with a matching equation a` la Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). We
return to the last two aspects in the next section, when we discuss identification issues in
more detail.
In general terms, the model we will attempt to estimate in this section can be written as:
ri = α0 + α1di + α2∆i + α3Xi + α4Z1,i + ε1,i; (10)
di = β0 + β1ri + β2∆i + β3Xi + β4Z2,i + ε2,i. (11)
In these equations, the rigidity of the price-setting mechanism r, and the duration of the
contract d are explained by each other, by a difference-in-difference variable (∆), which
identifies all contracts signed by electricity generators operating in restructured states after
electricity market restructuring legislation was passed, by a set of control variables (X), and
a different set of instrumental variables (Z), for each of the regressions. Finally, ε1,i and ε2,i
are idiosyncratic error terms.
4.1 Identification
In what follows, our main goal is to estimate the impact of electricity market restructuring on
the degree of price rigidity of procurement contracts and their duration. We use the variation
over time and across U.S. states in the restructuring of the electricity market to identify
the causal effect of changing regulation on procurement choices. As emerges from Table 2,
only about half of the States passed legislation to deregulate their electricity markets. This
peculiarity of the US experience provides us with the quasi-experimental set-up necessary to
test whether the restructuring of the electricity market has lead to a change in the nature
and the duration of the procurement contracts signed between generators and coal mines.
By being able to use generators in non-restructured states as our control group, we are
indeed able to isolate the effect of restructuring on the choice of procurement contracts in
restructured states. This methodology is only justified, however, if we can convincingly argue,
on the one hand, that the treatment choice, i.e. the decision to restructure, is exogenous
to contract rigidity and duration, and, on the other hand, that absent restructuring, plants
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operating in states that did in fact restructure their electricity markets would have mirrored
the behaviour of plants operating in non-restructured markets.
The first condition – i.e. the exogeneity of treatment – has been convincingly argued in a
number of other papers that also use restructuring as a natural experiment (e.g., Bushnell
and Wolfram, 2005; Fabrizio et al., 2007; Fowlie, 2010; Davis and Wolfram, 2012; Cicala,
2014). To summarize the arguments, the decision to restructure seems to be attributable
to differences in natural resource endowments and to poor investments and contracting
decisions made during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Joskow, 2003; Borenstein and Bushnell,
2000). Indeed, states which restructured generally had higher average electricity prices due
to lack of hydroelectric generation and sunk investments in generation that had proven
more expensive than expected – notably, nuclear and co-generation facilities (Joskow, 2003;
Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000). One of the main reasons for restructuring was to improve
investment decisions in new generation capacity, as opposed to improving existing generation,
and transfer the risk from investment in new generation from consumers to electricity suppliers
(Joskow, 2003; Bushnell and Wolfram, 2005). Furthermore, the belief is that electricity market
restructuring would have eventually spread to the entire country had it not been for the
California electricity crisis and Enron’s financial collapse so that in theory the treatment
would not have been contained to one “type” of state (Joskow, 2003).
It is obviously impossible to formally test the second condition discussed above given that the
counterfactual is not observed. We are going to argue, however, that plants in the treatment
and control groups exhibited similar behavior prior to the treatment (controlling for other
confounding factors), and that the contracting behaviour of plants in the control group did
not change as a consequence of electricity restructuring.24 We start with Figures 1 and 2.
The figures describe how the rigidity and duration, respectively, of contracts signed by plants
in the treatment group vary over the period of our analysis relative to the corresponding
values for plants in the control group.25 Overall, both contractual rigidity and duration
can be seen to evolve similarly over the pre-treatment period – i.e. before the passing of
restructuring legislation – in restructured and in non-restructured states. This implies that
the two groups exhibited similar trends before restructuring took place.
The second step in our argument is to verify that, net of common confounding factors, the
observable characteristics of the control group have remained sufficiently stable over time.
This would suggest that the control has not been affected by the treatment, or by other
unobservable shocks, making it plausible to claim that, in the absence of treatment, the
treated group itself would have developed similarly. A first look at the average rigidity and
duration of contracts signed by control plants suggests that both indicators have continued
to evolve during the treatment period along the same trend they exhibited prior to the start
of electricity market restructuring (see Figure 3 and 4). This impression is supported by the
summary statistics of the variables included in the empirical analysis that follows (Table
3). Overall the exogenous variables that are directly linked to the contractual behaviour
appear quite stable over time for the control group as a whole, as shown in the last column
of Table 3. The share of contracts written with a known counterpart, the characteristics of
24The assumption that the control group is not affected by the treatment, or “Stable Unit Treatment
Value Assumption” (SUTVA) is crucial for a satisfactory ‘experimental design’ that allows a proper causal
interpretation of the results (Rubin, 1980). We discuss this aspect at length later in the paper.
25Specifically, the figures plot the value of the estimated coefficient for each of the treatment-group vintage
dummies for rigidity and duration, along with the corresponding 90% confidence interval around the estimates.
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the coal, the minimum amount contracted for, as well as the relative size of contract to the
total quantity of coal sold (by the mine) and purchased (by the plant) are all not statistically
different for the average control plant, before and after treatment. The one notable exception
refers to the contractual treatment of sulfur, which can be seen to have radically changed
across the samples. This is in all probability due to the introduction of the Acid Rains
Program (ARP), whose first trading phase started in 1995. The need to submit emissions
permits for each ton of SO2 released by large coal-fired power plants would quite obviously
lead to significant changes in the approach to contracting in terms of the sulfur content of
the fuel. Table 3 shows that the mean Z-score increased over time, underscoring this point.
Intuitively, it makes sense for power plants to move towards contracts that give them a higher
probability of receiving coal that would allow them to meet their ARP compliance targets.
The need to source partially or totally different types of coal is further evidenced by the
change in the provenance of coal shipped to control plants, who seem to have substituted
higher-Btu, lower-SO2 Appalachian coal for lower grade Interior coal. This discussion leads
us to conclude that, while it is important to control for the introduction of the ARP in our
empirical analysis below, the overall behaviour of the control group as refers to their rigidity
and duration choices seems to have remained consistent over time.
In light of our discussion so far, we conclude that the assumptions behind our identification
strategy are supported by economic and historical arguments, as well as by the characteristics
of our data. It seems appropriate, therefore, to causally attribute differences in procurement
strategies observed between the treated and the control group after restructuring to the policy
change itself. In a later section, we return to this crucial aspect by discussing the placebo
tests we conducted, and a test of one possible deviation from the Stable Unit Treatment
Value Assumption (SUTVA) assumption.
4.2 Data
To estimate equations (10) and (11) we use data derived from several sources. Our main
source of information on coal procurement contracts is the Coal Transportation Rate Database
(CTRB), which is taken from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 580
“Interrogatory on Fuel and Energy Purchase Practices”. The data are a representative survey
of investor-owned, interstate electric generator plants with steam-electric generating stations
with more than 50 Megawatts of installed capacity. Our database contains information on
contracts signed for the years 1990-2001, including the price-setting mechanism specified
in the contract and its duration, information on the lower and upper bounds for a number
of coal quality attributes included in the contract, information on plant characteristics and
identifiers for the county of origin of coal purchases.26
The data identifies contracts and any renegotiation of the contract, though this analysis
only utilizes information for newly signed contracts. Information on changes to contract
terms when a contract is renegotiated is not utilized here as the bargaining structure is quite
different than the one modelled above. The data lists the contract as having one of seven
types of price adjustment mechanisms: Base price plus escalation; Price renegotiation; Price
tied to market; Cost-Plus with a fixed fee provision; Cost-Plus with an incentive fee provision;
26The dataset contain information on contracts signed previous to 1990, however the coal market went
through some large changes in the 1980s (see (Joskow, 1988) for more on these changes) which imply that
contracts signed during this time will not be proper controls for contracts signed in the 1990s and beyond.
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Fixed price; Other. As detailed in Table 1, we code these contract types from 1 to 4 in
increasing order of rigidity, and we drop the category “Other”.27 The table also lists, for
each contract type, the definition provided by FERC to plants in the survey’s documentation.
Duration is calculated subtracting the year the contract was signed from the expiration year
indicated in the data.
In our empirical analysis we need to be able to discern the ‘treated’ plants in restructured
states from the ‘control’ ones in states that did not restructure their electricity markets. Our
theoretical priors, however, also tell us that the degree of market liberalization should also
matter, as more ‘intensive’ treatments should lead to more marked effects in terms of their
impact on procurement contracts. To capture the effect of the intensity of treatment, Post
Restructuring, our difference-in-difference indicator of interest – i.e. ∆ in the equations
(10) and (11) – is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for new contracts signed
by electricity generators operating in restructured states after legislation was passed to
restructure the electricity market, and a value of 2 when the retail side of the electricity
market also began allowing competition.28,29 The argument for retail choice altering the
competitiveness of wholesale markets relies on the fact that a monopolist retail supplier is
more likely to source its electricity from within the firm than outside the firm. New retail
suppliers, which generally do not have their own local generation, are more likely to purchase
in the wholesale market based on price.(see, for example, Mansur, 2007)
We introduce a number of variables to control for changes to the regulatory environment
and for idiosyncrasies in contractual relationships. To control for the passing into law of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the introduction of the Acid Rain Programme
(ARP), we include a dummy, called “Post SO2 Regulation”, which takes the value of one
for all contracts signed in 1991 or after and is zero otherwise. Furthermore, we identify
plants involved in Phase I of the ARP by means of a “Mandatory Phase I Plant” dummy.
A dummy was created to determine whether the plant and mine had written a contract
previously. “Previous Interaction” takes the value of one if the plant and mine had
already been involved in a contractual relationship with each other prior to signing the given
contract and is zero otherwise. Finally, a “Restructured State” dummy was created which
takes the value of one if a state ever restructures its electricity market and is zero otherwise.
This allows us to control for structural difference between treated and control states.
Given the potential endogeneity problems due to the contemporaneous choice of rigidity and
duration discussed above, one needs to choose appropriate instruments, i.e. variables that
only affect one of the choice variables directly, while not directly impacting on the other. Our
search for appropriate instruments is informed by our theoretical framework, and in particular
by the discussion of the results of Proposition 2. In the process of proving Proposition 2, we
showed that the choice of price rigidity is directly impacted by risk (i.e. by σ2e and σ
2
x in our
27Alternative forms of this ordinal ranking for rigidity were specified, and robustness checks conducted
using these alternative dependent variables for r. The result were found to be qualitatively very similar. The
full results of these tests are available from the authors upon request.
28To check the robustness of our results, we constructed an alternative difference-in-difference indicator
which assumes a value of 1 for contracts signed by electricity generators operating in restructured states
after restructuring legislation was passed and 0 otherwise. The change had little qualitative impact on the
conclusions of the analysis. The full set of results are available from the authors.
29Ohio and Texas are two prime examples where the restructuring processes were different than in other
states. Estimation of (10) and (11) were performed without Ohio and Texas separately. There was no
qualitative difference for these estimations and the ones in the paper. The full set of results are available from
the authors.
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model), whereas such parameters do not impact directly on the choice of duration. Conversely,
the transaction cost-shifters A only directly affect the choice of duration. This leads us to
identify variables that proxy for the actual degree of risk – such as the perceived variability of
electricity prices and plants’ exposure to input cost risk – as plausible instruments for rigidity.
Transaction cost shifters – e.g., variables that provide information on relation-specific assets –
are, instead, good candidates as instruments for duration.
To capture the degree of price uncertainty faced by electricity generators, one would ideally
use a measure of dispersion for the wholesale electricity price. For regulated markets,
however, a wholesale price does not actually exist, and the so-called “system lambdas”, which
measure the marginal cost of production, while available for regulated markets are often not
directly comparable to prices. As a result, for the sake of comparability between treated
and control plants, we use the standard deviation of capacity utilization for gas and oil
fired generators (Utilization Variability) to measure the degree of price uncertainty by
electricity generators. The rationale for this approach is simple: plants which are primarily
fired with oil and gas represent the high-cost technologies for producing electricity over the
sample we analyze. As such, they would be utilized only under conditions of high demand,
which are associated with high prices for electricity. Hence, the variability in the utilization
of oil and gas-fired plants proxies for the variability in the price of electricity, σ2e . To proxy
for input-cost risk, we first include an indicator for whether the mine is an underground mine
(Underground Mine), and then create dummies that control for provenance of coal using the
coal-producing regions defined by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), and include
“Interior Mine” and “Western Mine” in our regressions.30 The understanding here is that,
since both the physical characteristics of coal seams and mining practices differ across basins,
underground mines and mines in different basins have different cost structures. Besides this
rather crude measure of input-cost risk, we also want to include measures that take into
account the match between coal characteristics and boiler types. Indeed, when plants write a
contract with mines for monthly delivery of coal, they specify the limits of attributes that
are acceptable for deliveries. As pointed out by Crio and Condren (1984) and Kerkvliet
and Shogren (1992), however, plants often use long-term contracts to procure coal with
attributes that match the design parameters of their boiler, so that the attributes specified in
the contract are a function of the technical characteristics of the boiler, and as such can be
deemed exogenous to the procurement choice.31 Thus, the degree of input-cost risk a plant
is exposed to is a function of both the physical characteristics of the available coal and of
the technical characteristics of the plant. To capture these aspects we include Z-scores for
different coal attributes (Z-Ash, Z-Btu, Z-Sulfur) for each Bureau of Mines coal producing
district. The Z-score – i.e. the difference between the allowable level of an attribute and the
mean value of that attribute for coal mined in the district, divided by the standard deviation
of the attribute at the district level – measures the probability that the average mine in the
district is able to deliver coal that meets the plant’s technical requirements.
As empirical counterparts for the shifters of the transaction cost functions in the theoretical
model, we focus on variables that might proxy for the likelihood of breach of contract, in
30The omitted category refers to mines located in Appalachia.
31Generally, in long-term contracts the maximum (minimum) levels of attributes such as ash, sulfur,
moisture, and heat (Btu) that are allowed are specified. Ash, sulfur, and moisture are undesirable attributes,
therefore specifying lower maximum levels of these attributes in a contract imply the requirement to source
higher quality coal. Btu’s, on the other hand, are a positive attribute; therefore a higher minimum level
specified implies a higher quality coal.
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particular we consider variables that proxy for the availability of alternative contracting
partners and for the relative importance of a specific contract to each of the parties (Joskow,
1987; Kerkvliet and Shogren, 2001; Kozhevnikova and Lange, 2009). As discussed in Section
3, factors that increase the availability of alternative options might be correlated with a
shorter contractual duration, whereas higher levels of dedicated assets ought to be correlated
with longer contracts. The instruments we use for this purpose are: proxies for the level of
dedicated assets that both the plant and the mine have in the relationship at the time of the
first delivery (“Plant Dedicated Assets” and “Mine Dedicated Assets”, respectively),
calculated as the ratio of an individual contract quantity to the sum of the plant’s (mine’s)
overall contract quantity32; the minimum quantity of coal to be transacted each month,
“Minimum Quantity”; and a dummy that indicates whether the plant can receive deliveries
through multiple modes of transportation,“Multiple Mode of Delivery”. The “Multiple
Mode of Delivery” dummy is a good candidate as an instrument for duration because
it is clearly exogenous to the rigidity decision being the outcome of previous investment
decisions and as such predetermined. Moreover, the possibility to receive coal deliveries using
multiple means of transportation makes the plant less dependent on any given supplier, and
thus affects the optimal choice of contractual duration. The remaining instruments are also
likely correlated with a predetermined variable, the plant’s output rating (i.e. its productive
capacity). The reason for this is that most long-term contracts signed between mines and
coal-fired power plants specify a minimum take linked to the productive capacity of the boiler.
As mentioned in Section 2, coal-fired plants tend to be targeted at base-loads and operate
continuously. Since coal is bulky and storage capacity limited, one of the main concern of
coal-fired generators is not to run out of fuel. As productive capacity is given at the time the
contract is signed, it is likely to be uncorrelated with the rigidity decision. On the other hand,
the relative importance of a given contract to both mine and plant influences the stability
of the contractual relation, as the parties are less likely to walk away from a large contract.
Thus, the probability of a breach of contract decreases with the minimum take, as does, for
the reasons discussed in Section 3, the marginal cost of duration. One would then expect
duration to be positively correlated with minimum take. Thus, our theoretical priors suggest
that all the instruments mentioned above should be both exogenous and relevant.33
As pointed out by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), one concern that emerges when empirically
estimating the determinants of contract choices via reduced-form regressions that use sellers’
and buyers’ characteristics is that, if these characteristics are imperfectly measured, and
if buyers and sellers are not randomly matched, a simple OLS approach risks providing
biased estimates. Our theoretical insights do not depend on how sellers and buyers are
matched, in the sense that, irrespective of the matching procedure, an increase in the degree
of market liberalization would lead to more rigid, shorter contracts. There are reasons,
however, to believe that in reality the matching between mines and plants does depend on
some of the characteristics of the agents. For example, one would intuitively think that plants
operating in high-risk environments have stronger preferences for rigid contracts relative to
plants facing less volatile output prices, while low-cost-volatility mines would not dislike rigid
32As the data does not contain a mine identification code, a county of coal origin code is used instead.
33A number of other instruments with similar characteristics are available to us. We have information
on whether the plant owns the transportation equipment used to deliver coal, the number of mines active
in the county the contracted coal is being shipped from, and finally, the boiler rated output. We use these
instruments both as an alternative to and in combination with the ones discussed in the main text. The
results of our instrumental variable estimates are extremely robust to the choice of instrument. The full set of
alternative results is available from the authors.
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contracts quite as much as mines that experience large shocks to their extraction costs. As a
consequence, it is easy to imagine that some form of assortative matching occurs between
high-risk plants and low-risk mines. To alleviate the potential endogeneity issues, we follow
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and introduce a ‘matching’ equation which regresses our
proxy for revenue uncertainty, Utilization Variability, on a set of destination state
dummies, and the same dummies interacted (as appropriate) with our proxies for extraction
cost volatility (Z-Ash, Z-Btu, Z-Sulfur, Underground Mine, Interior Mine, and Western
Mine). The predicted values of Utilization Variability are subsequently included in the
estimation of equations (10).
4.3 Results
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the estimation of equations (10) and (11), respectively. In
each table we first present a benchmark model, which does not correct for endogeneity. We
then discuss models that use an instrumental variable approach to control for the simultaneity
of the rigidity and duration decision. Finally, the results from a system estimation of the
rigidity and duration equations are presented. Furthermore, in Table 4 we present results that
assess the sensitivity of our conclusions to biases induced by the endogeneity of the match
between sellers and buyers, a` la Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). Standard errors are either
clustered at state level to correct for potential state-level serial correlation, or bootstrapped
as appropriate.
The results of Table 4 support the theoretical predictions of Proposition 1: electricity market
restructuring does lead to the signing of more rigid contracts (see Hypothesis 1). This
result emerges as a robust finding of our analysis across all specification as the coefficient of
the Post Restructuring dummy is everywhere positive, stable in magnitude, and always
significant. Another aspect to clearly emerge from Table 4 is that our regressions show that
rigidity and duration are substitutes at the optimum. The coefficients on Duration are
indeed negative throughout and statistically significant in all specifications. The coefficient is
fairly stable when moving from a specification that does not correct for the endogeneity to
one that does, only varying in magnitude when rigidity is treated as continuous as opposed
to ordinal, implying little endogeneity bias. The F -test for excluded instruments in the
first stage is highly statistically significant across all four specifications that instrument for
duration. Based on Column (3), a series of tests for the validity of our instruments are
conducted. Hansens test fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid (J-test=5.54,
p-value=0.14), and the model passes both the Kleinbergen-Paap underidentification test (LM
statistic=15.09, p-value=0.00) and the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald test for weak identification
(F -test=10.64). The results of these tests confirm that the instruments we use are both valid
and relevant.34 In Column (4) we also instrument for Utilization Variability to control
for the possibility of an endogenous match between mines and plants. The coefficient on
Utilization Variability switches sign, but remains statistically insignificant. The other
coefficients in the regression, including Post Restructuring, are largely unaffected by this
procedure. We conclude that the endogenous nature of the matching does not represent a
problem in terms of our main objective, which remains to assess the impact of electricity
34To test the robustness of our results, we replicated these results with subsets of the current variables, and
including the other variables described in Footnote 33. The results, available from the authors, qualitatively
confirm our conclusions.
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market restructuring on the degree of contractual price rigidity agreed by the parties.
The signs of the coefficients of the other controls conform to our theoretical expectations.
Recall that higher levels of Z-Ash and Z-Sulfur – as well as lower levels of Z-Btu – are
associated with lower uncertainty, as the mines operating in the specified district are more
likely to be able to deliver coal that meets the boiler’s technical specifications. The same
mines ought to more willing to sign relatively more rigid contracts, given that they face
less risk. This intuition is confirmed by the estimated coefficient of Z-Ash, Z-Sulfur,
and Z-Btu, all of which have consistently the expected sign, even if they are not always
statistically significant. Since underground coal is more costly to extract and underground
mines face higher probability of industrial accidents, one would expect that mines extracting
coal from pits would be more reluctant to sign rigidly priced contracts. As expected, the
coefficient’s estimates for Underground Mineare consistently negative, albeit significant in
only one instance. Appalachian mines have more challenging technical problems and have
traditionally had a more unionized work-force, thus they are both more risky and more
exposed to macroeconomic shocks that may affect the labor market, relative to Interior and
Western mines. Accordingly, the coefficients for both Interior Mine and Western Mine are
expected to be positive as these mines are much less exposed to the kind of shocks discussed
above, and hence more likely to accept rigidly priced contracts. The relevant coefficients are
all positive and, at least for Western Mine, statistically significant across all specifications.
Finally, the coefficient of the Utilization Variability variable, which proxies for the
volatility of the price of electricity, is always statistically insignificant. Once the endogeneity
of the matching between sellers and buyers is controlled for, however, as in Column (4) of
Table 4, the coefficient, while remaining statistically insignificant, becomes positive, which is
the theoretically expected sign.
Table 5 shows the results from the estimation of the duration equation, (11). The first
column does not control for the possible endogeneity of rigidity, while the other columns
attempt to control for it using instruments that proxy for input-cost and output-price risk.
Our strategy for the selection of instruments here deserves some discussion. In Table 5 we
report IV estimates of equation (11) carried out using the complete set of instruments we
discussed in Section 4.2 above, i.e. Z-Ash, Z-Sulfur, Z-Btu, Western Mine, Interior Mine,
Underground Mine and Utilization Variability. These instruments as a set comfortably
pass Hansen’s J test for exogenity (J-test=7.73, p-value=0.26), and perform reasonably well
in terms of the tests for under-identification and for weak identification.35,Some concerns,
however, arise from the F -statistic of the test for the relevance of the instruments we present
in Column (2). The reported value of 4.34 is indeed some way from the recommended
value of 10. In order to gauge the validity of our instruments, we experimented with all
possible combinations of the original instruments. The only case for which we obtain an
F -test in excess of 10 is in the exactly identified model which uses Western Mine as the only
instrument (see Column (3) of Table 5) . In this case, the F -test for excluded instruments in
the first stage is 12.00, the Kleibergen-Paap χ2 LM statistic is 8.55 (p-value=0.00), and the
Cragg-Donald Wald F -statistic equals 36.68. Since in this case we are unable to compute
Hansen’s over-identification statistic, we compute the J-statistic for the next best model
for which we can test for the orthogonality of Western Mine in isolation. This model is the
one which uses Western Mine, Z-Sulfur, and Interior Mine as instruments for rigidity.
In this case the J test statistic for the joint test of over-identification of all instruments
35The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is 12.71, and its p-value 0.0795
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equals 0.14 (p-value=0.93), whereas the C-statistic for the orthogonality of Western Mine
is 0.099 (p-value=0.75). We conclude that Western Mine is a valid instrument for rigidity.
Columns (4) and (5) present the results of the IV procedure which uses only Western Mine
as an instrument for rigidity, when we take into account the fact that Duration is a positive
variable and Rigidity a categorical variable.
The Post Restructuring results are in line with the implications of our theoretical analysis –
see Hypothesis 2 – as it is generally not statistically significant. One potential concern in this
context is that other authors (e.g. Joskow, 1987; Kerkvliet and Shogren, 2001; Kozhevnikova
and Lange, 2009) have shown that duration of contracts has been falling over our sample
period – indeed the time control variables are statistically significant and negative in sign.
Against this backdrop, the identification of a further decrease in duration for contracts signed
by restructured plants might be difficult.
Rigidity is generally statistically significant and negative and instrumenting for rigidity,
Columns (2)-(4), leads to a larger negative coefficient. This is consistent with our theoretical
insights that rigidity and duration are substitutes at the optimum. Overall, however, the
changes are of no great consequence in terms of our key question here, as the effect of
electricity market restructuring on contractual duration, while slightly larger, remains mostly
insignificant. This result is robust to the changes in the set of instruments discussed
above. The costs shifters discussed in Section 4.2 appear here as controls for Duration.
Mine Dedicated Assets and Minimum Quantity have the correct sign and are statistically
significant in all specifications. Plant Dedicated Assets has the correct sign throughout
but is not statistically significant, while the sign for Multiple Mode of Delivery is the
opposite of what one would have expected. Indeed, our intuition would suggest that the
easier it is for the plant to have coal delivered from alternative sources, the less stable the
contractual relationship, the shorter the contract.
4.4 Discussion
The results presented thus far confirm our theoretical insight that in response to changes
in the market environment that expose them to more output-price risk, coal-fired power
plants will strive to introduce more rigid pricing in their procurement contracts, to limit their
exposure to input-price risk. A closer inspection of Figure 1, however, reveals a difficulty
with our analysis. There, the difference between contractual rigidity in treated and control
states becomes statistically significant only with a pronounced lag. To explain this aspect
of our results, we need to take into account that the deregulation legislation was staggered
over time, so that the red line in the figure is only indicative of the beginning of treatment in
some states. In the figure, the average rigidity is computed pooling all contracts signed by
plants in deregulated states, so that contracts of the same vintage signed after 1996 may in
fact be contracts signed in already-deregulated states and in not-yet-deregulated ones. To
properly account for these lags in deregulation, we create an alternative version of Figure 1,
this time including dummies that measure time relative to the year of deregulation, rather
than calendar time. In this way we obtain the estimates reported in Figure 5. The graph
confirms that contractual rigidity increases immediately after deregulation. Interestingly,
Figure 5 also suggests that, following deregulation, plants and mines have entered a phase of
learning about the design of an optimal contract. Indeed, the degree of contractual rigidity is
shown to increase with the passage of time after deregulation.
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A further remark on the rigidity regressions is in order. Fowlie (2010) suggests that restruc-
tured plants may have chosen not to undertake new capital investment to comply with the
NOx Budget Programme, preferring to alter the type of coal they contracted for. If fuel
switching lead power plants to contract with mines with lower extraction cost risk, and
thus lower aversion for rigidity, it might have been the cause of the increase in contractual
rigidity that we identify in Table 4. In other words, it would be the NOx Budget Programme,
not restructuring to cause the increase in rigidity. For this to be a convincing explanation,
however, we should observe a significant shift in the geographical origin of the coal sourced
by regulated plants. As seen in Table 3, however, the distribution of contracts signed across
the three coal basins is constant for the restructured plants before and after restructuring.36
Additionally, as discussed above, once the timing of deregulation is properly accounted for, the
contractual rigidity can be shown to increase immediately once deregulation is implemented.
This means that for the first deregulated states the changes in contractual rigidity pre-date
the introduction of the NOx Budget Programme by at least four years.
37 Furthermore, in the
rigidity equation we control for potential differences in mine’s preferences for rigidity with
the Z-scores, a coal basin dummy, and an Underground Mine dummy.
As in any ‘quasi-experimental’ setting our challenge lies in convincingly attributing the
observed changes in behavior to the treatment. While our discussion of the identification
strategy in Section 4.1 goes a long way towards justifying our research design, in the interest
of completeness we also want to rule out to the extent possible, that the results obtained above
are purely due to chance. We then perform a so-called ‘placebo test’ whereby, after dropping
the treated observations from the sample, we randomly allocate states to two groups, the
placebo group and the control group. This reassignment completed, we replicate our analysis
above and test whether the coefficient of the placebo indicator is statistically significant.
Failure to reject the null that the coefficient is actually zero would suggest that the relative
increase in price rigidity we observe in the data is in fact due to the effect of the treatment.
The two panels in Figure 6 presents the distribution of coefficient estimates for the rigidity (a),
and the duration regression (b), respectively, obtained replicating the experiment described
above 10,000 times. At each iteration a new random assignment of States to the placebo and
control groups is performed, and the model re-estimated using the same instrumental variable
procedures as in Table 4, column (3), and Table 5, column (3). As can be clearly appreciated,
we cannot reject the null that both coefficients are indeed statistically insignificant. The
procedure thus supports our conclusion that the increase in price rigidity for contract signed
by plants in restructured states we observe in the data is indeed due to the treatment, and
not to mere chance.
One final concern with the kind of study we are conducting is that the treatment might
somehow spill over to the control group, thus invalidating the SUTVA. In our study, the units
we use to form the control estimates participate in the coal market alongside treated ones. In
particular, some of the mines in our data set might be at the same time contracting with
plants in restructured states and with others that operate in regulated markets. One might
suspect, for example, that a mine that is forced into more rigid contracts by its customers in
36The t-statistics, and the associated p-values, for the tests for difference in means across different coal
basins, before and after treatment are: Appalachia, t = 0.26, p-value= 0.79; West, t = 0.10, p-value= 0.92;
Interior, t = −0.72, p-value= 0.47.
37The first restructuring laws were implemented in 1996, whereas the US Court of Appeals upheld the NOx
Budget Programme in early 2000. The deadline for full compliance was set for May 2004.
25
Risk and Coal Procurement Contracts
deregulated markets might try to compensate by pushing for less rigid contract with its other,
regulated, customers than it would otherwise have done in the absence of the treatment.
In this case, our estimates of the effect of the treatment on the treated would be biased
upwards. To test for such treatment spillovers, we identify mines38 that sell coal to both
regulated and unregulated plants and test whether their behavior is anyway different from
the behavior of mines that only sell coal to regulated plants. Table 6 reports the results of
this procedure. The variable of interest here is the indicator discussed above, “Mine Selling
to Both Plant Types”, which emerges consistently as insignificant across all specifications.
We conclude that, at least as refers to this potential spillover channel, the SUTVA seems to
hold. While we have no theoretical priors on how the treatment might spill over in terms of
our duration regressions, we perform the same test for duration, for the sake of completeness.
Also in this context mines that operate across different regulatory regimes are shown not to
behave differently when negotiating with plants in regulated states, relative to mines that
only sell to such plants. Once again, these results support the SUTVA.39
5 Contract changes, mining efficiency, and transaction costs
Our theoretical discussion and empirical evidence so far have illustrated that restructuring
in the downstream market has real effects on the contractual behavior of parties upstream.
In particular, the move to more rigidly priced contracts emerges prominently from both the
theoretical and empirical analysis. In what follows, we address the implications of more rigid
contracts discussed in section 3.5.
5.1 Productivity
We start by discussing Hypothesis 3, namely that changes in contractual rigidity, by changing
the incentives for cost reducing effort on the part of mines, might lead to increases in
mining efficiency. Our findings that plants in restructured electricity markets sign contracts
characterized by more rigid price adjustment mechanisms are interesting per se since they
highlight a novel channel through which market restructuring affects firms’ behavior. Even
more interesting, however, is the question whether such changes would push coal mines to
improve their efficiency. To test this proposition, we use again a difference-in-difference design.
The model is,
pi,t = ζi + γ1Σi,t + γ2Xi,t + εi,t; (12)
where pi,t is county i’s coal mines average labor productivity in year t, ζi is the county fixed
effect, Σi,t is the difference-in-difference variable indicating whether a mine sold coal under a
new contract to a plant in a restructured state after restructuring legislation was passed, Xi,t
is a set of control variables, and εi,t an idiosyncratic error term.
40,41 County i’s coal mine
38As discussed above, in the absence of mine identification codes, we resort to the county-of-coal-origin
code, instead.
39The full set of results relative to the duration regressions is available from the authors upon request.
40The data used in the estimation of (10) are derived from a representative sample of all contracts, and are
too few per mine-year to use in this analysis. As a result, we cannot use the rigidity of the price adjustment
mechanism directly here. The data utilized for this estimation is the population of transactions between plants
and mines, and it allows a full picture of the impact on mines of selling coal to restructured plants.
41Data on plant purchases does not link to a specific mine but rather links to the county of origin. This is
the level utilized in the productivity analysis.
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labor productivity, pi,t, is measured as the average number of short tons of coal produced
per mine employee in any given year by mines located in the county i. The data is taken
from the Mine Health and Safety Administration (MHSA) Part 50 Address/Employment
Dataset. The difference-in-difference variable, “Coal to Restructured State”, equals one
if any of county i’s mines sold any coal, under a new contract to a plant located in a state
that had passed restructuring legislation and is zero otherwise. This specification is consistent
with the difference-in-difference variables used in equations (10) and (11). Information on
sales of contract coal is taken from the FERC 423 dataset. As control variables we use
the number of injuries per worker in year t, and its squared term, a variable indicating the
proportions of mines in the state-county that have been producing continuously (i.e. they
did not shut down) during year t, and its squared term, together with year dummy variables.
“Injuries per worker” and “Continuous Production” data, also come from the MHSA
Part 50 Address/Employment Dataset.
To support our identification strategy we refer back to the discussion in Section 4.1, as far
as the exogeneity of treatment is concerned, and focus here on the appropriateness of the
control group. First, we focus on the stability of the trend in the control group. Figure 8
graphs the average productivity of mines in our control group over the time horizon of our
analysis. The series doesn’t exhibit any break or a change in trend once the legislation is
passed.42 Second, we concentrate on the comparability of the treatment and control groups.
Figure 7 plots the evolution of labor productivity for mines which sold coal under a new
contract to plants in restructured states after restructuring (the treatment group), relative to
the productivity of mines that never sold to a plant in a State that eventually deregulated
(our control group).43 The labor productivity for the two groups trends similarly before any
restructuring legislation is passed. Overall the evidence justifies our causal interpretation of
changes in productivity as being driven by deregulation.
Table 7 shows the results of the estimation of equation (12). According to our results,
controlling for other determinants of productivity, mines that sell coal to plants in restructured
states are on average 11% more productive than the control group. This finding supports the
argument that the move to higher-powered incentives in contracts written by restructured
plants lead to an increase in productivity by mines.
Similarly to what is seen for rigidity, Figure 7 shows that the labour productivity of treated
mines, rather than deviating significantly from the productivity of the control ones on impact
– that is as soon as the treatment becomes effective – becomes significantly larger only with
a lag of two years, and then strongly so with an even longer delay. Two aspects might be
driving this result. First, counties are recruited to the treated group as soon as one mine in
the county signs a new contract with a power plant operating in a state that has introduced
deregulation legislation, irrespectively of the amount of coal being contracted and of the
relative importance of the contract in the total output of the county. Evidently, it might be
the case that initially only a limited share of the mines and a small fraction of the total coal
extracted in any given county is sold under more rigid contracts, so that the effort-inducing
impact of the new contracts gets diluted. As more and more mines in each of the treated
42Coal productivity across the whole industry dropped in 2001 after increasing throughout the 1990s and in
2000 (U.S. EIA, 2010). The decrease shown for the control in Figure 8 is even stronger in the treatment group.
Indeed, Figure 7 shows that the productivity of the treatment group as a whole decreases in 2001 relative to
2000.
43To be more precise, the figure plots the estimated coefficients for the treatment-group specific year
dummies, along with the corresponding 90% confidence interval around these estimates.
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counties sign new contracts with deregulated plants over time, however, the changed nature
of the contractual relationship starts having more marked impacts, and gradually the change
in productivity becomes statistically significant. Secondly, as discussed in Section 4.3, we
find evidence of a rather steep learning curve faced by plants and mines after deregulation
so that the rigidity of contracts in treated states increases over time (see Figure 5). As
rigidity increases, the efficiency-inducing incentives for the mines become stronger. Hence,
the gradual increase in rigidity over time might be a further contributing factor in explaining
the lag in productivity increases noted above.
Our results on productivity gains, besides being in line with economic theory, are also
consistent with the evidence discussed by both Cicala (2014) and Chan, Fell, Lange, and Li
(2013), that plants in restructured states pay a statistically lower price for their coal. Indeed,
more efficient mines would be able to provide coal at lower prices. Interestingly, even the
magnitude of the coefficient of restructuring on coal mine productivity in Table 7 is consistent
with the drop in coal prices found in Cicala (2014) and Chan et al. (2013). Cicala (2014) finds
a 12% drop in coal prices, while Chan et al. (2013) estimate the drop to be closer to 10%,
both of which are broadly in line with our results. Neither of these papers, however, explicitly
discusses the mechanism that could have lead to lower coal prices. Our analysis suggests that
the increased price rigidity of contracts due to restructuring could be the mechanism behind
this drop in prices. By introducing higher-powered incentives for cost savings, changes in
procurement contracts might have brought about productivity increases, and ultimately the
decreases in prices documented in the literature.
Cicala (2014) notes that plants in restructured states are more likely to switch to out-of-state
coal mines to procure fuel, and that after divestiture the labour content of coal purchased by
plants in restructured states decreases. These findings suggest an alternative explanation for
our results here. It is indeed possible that the increase in productivity we report in Table
7 might be linked to the sorting of highly productive mines into contracts with plants in
restructured states, and low productivity mines with plants in traditionally regulated states, a
change that need not imply any actual productivity gain. If our results were being driven by
such a re-ordering of mines, however, we would expect to find evidence that some mines that
previously were not selling coal to plants in restructured states would start doing so, after
restructuring. In our dataset, however, we could find no county whose mine were not initially
selling to a plant in a would-be restructured state that started after treatment commenced.
A more subtle way to test Cicala’s hypothesis is to look at mines (counties) that stopped
shipping coal to restructured markets after restructuring took place (the ‘discontinuing’
group), and compare their productivity levels with those of mines that kept selling even after
restructuring (the ‘continuing’ group). According to the sorting hypothesis, the latter group
should exhibit higher productivity levels in the period before restructuring. Using our data,
we can test the (one-sided) hypothesis that the average labour productivity of the continuing
firms is higher than that of the discontinuing ones. Table 8 presents the results of the test for
the difference in means across the two samples, between 1991 and 1995, the year before the
first treatment period begins. The test results suggest that there is no statistically difference
in the level of productivity between (groups of) mines that stopped selling to restructured
states, and those who, instead continued selling there. We conclude that the type of sorting
hypothesizes by Cicala (2014) is unlikely to be driving our results.
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5.2 Renegotiations
Against the possible gains due to the improved productivity highlighted above, one needs
to weigh the possible losses due to changes in procurement contracts. In particular, one
aspect often discussed in the literature is the fact that more rigid contracts are more costly to
negotiate and prone to more frequent renegotiations (Tadelis and Williamson, 2012). Thus,
the increase in contract rigidity identified in Section 4.3 could imply an increase in transaction
costs. While it is not possible, given the available data, to gauge directly whether transaction
costs have increased, one possible – albeit indirect – test of this hypothesis is to test whether
more rigid contracts are actually renegotiated more frequently. To analyze the effect of
contract rigidity on renegotiation, we estimate the following model:
mi = θ0 + θ1ri + θ2di + θ3Xi + εi; (13)
where mi is the time to the first renegotiation of the contract, ri and di are the rigidity of
the price adjustment mechanism and the intended contractual duration of contract i, Xi is a
vector of control variables, and εi is an idiosyncratic error term.
Table 9 shows the results of the estimation of equation (13) performed using a poisson model.
A more rigid price adjustment mechanism is associated with a shorter time until the first
renegotiation of the contract, whereas a longer contractual duration has the opposite effect,
increasing the number of years until first renegotiation.
These results conform to our theoretical priors. A more rigid pricing mechanism, by exposing
the mine to the full cost of adverse realizations of extraction costs, tends to make the
contractual relationship more vulnerable vis-a`-vis such shocks. This evidence is suggestive
of the fact that restructuring could have harmful effects in as far as frequent renegotiations
imply an increase in the industry-wide transaction costs.
6 Conclusions
A substantial body of literature attempts to assess the economic impacts of electricity
market restructuring. This literature, however, mostly focuses on how deregulation impacts
directly on the regulated entities. In this paper we break with this tradition and analyze the
consequences of deregulation on the contractual relationships that characterize the supply
chain upstream from the deregulated market. Our analysis suggests that this previously
overlooked aspect of deregulation might have substantial welfare implications.
During the 1990s, a number of U.S. states restructured their electricity market so that
power generators could no longer be assured of cost recovery or a dedicated buyer for their
output. Restructuring thus increased the uncertainty such plants operated under, as they
then needed to compete to sell electricity and could not be guaranteed an output price. We
have presented a theoretical discussion of the likely impact of these changes on the optimal
choice of procurement contracts. Our analysis predicts that plants would respond to the
increased uncertainty by signing contracts for coal delivery with a more rigid price adjustment
mechanism. In our model, the use of a more rigid price adjustment mechanism reduces the
plant’s exposure to uncertainty in upstream prices, offsetting the downstream increase in
uncertainty. Our empirical analysis uses coal contracts data spanning the period 1990-2001
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and finds evidence that strongly supports our theoretical predictions.
One effect of the change to a more rigid price adjustment mechanism is that it provides higher-
powered cost-reduction incentives to the upstream supply chain, coal mines in this instance.
Results here show that these increased incentives did lead to a significant improvement in
coal mine productivity. Our estimate of the magnitude of this increase in productivity is
very close to the estimated reduction in coal prices recently discussed by Cicala (2014) and
Chan et al. (2013). We argue that the evidence provided here can be seen as the mechanism
behind the price reductions found by these authors.
On the other hand, transaction costs economics points out that more rigid price adjustment
mechanisms entail higher transaction costs, both in terms of the initial negotiation costs
and in terms of more frequent renegotiations and more likely breaches of contract. One
might quite naturally be concerned that the productivity improvements discussed above
could be offset by changes in the transaction cost associated with the more rigid contracts
being signed. To assess this aspect, we estimated the impact of price rigidity on the time
to first renegotiation for the contracts in our sample. Our findings reveal that a more rigid
price adjustment mechanism is indeed associated with a shorter time to first renegotiation,
providing an empirical basis to our concerns.
The implications of our research are far-reaching. Until now, the empirical work on the effects
of deregulation has largely ignored the impacts of the deregulation process upstream. In this
paper we demonstrate that there are reasons to suggest that such omission is potentially
of significance from the point of view of the analysis of the efficiency of the industry. The
potential for efficiency spillovers upstream of the deregulated sectors could be as large as the
gains from deregulation to the deregulated sector. Cicala (2014), for example, estimates that
the aggregate cost savings from the decreased fuel price might be as large as 1 billion dollars
per year. The potential for upstream efficiency spillovers is also interesting from an equity
standpoint. The goal of deregulation is for the efficiency improvements to flow to consumers,
however it is certainly possible that these gains stay within the deregulated sector. Clearly,
more work is needed to assess the net impact of deregulation on efficiency in the upstream
market.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a fixed contract γ = (r, d). Substituting the expression (1) for the price of coal into
the value function of the mine given in (5), we obtain the mine’s maximization problem:
max
e≥0
(1 + θm)
[
δ(r) + (1− r)E(x(χ, e))− E(x(χ, e))− km(r, d ;A)− g(e)
]
− θmb(α)rσx,
Differentiating the objective function with respect to e we obtain that at the optimal level,
e∗, we have
F (e∗, r) = (1 + θm)
[
− r∂E(x(χ, e
∗))
∂e
− ∂g(e
∗)
∂e
]
− θmb(α)r∂σx
∂e
= 0 (A.1)
Recall that by assumption ∂E(x(χ, e))/∂e < 0, ∂g(e)/∂e > 0 and ∂σx/∂e can be either
positive, negative, or zero, thus an interior solution for e∗ is possible.
To verify that at e∗, we obtain a maximum, we study the second order condition:
∂2V m(γ, e)
∂e2
= (1 + θm)
[
− r∂
2E(x(χ, e∗))
∂e2
− ∂
2g(e∗)
∂e2
]
− θmb(α)r∂
2σx
∂e2
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from the assumptions that ∂2E(x(χ, e))/∂e2 > 0, ∂2g(e)/∂e2 >
0 and ∂2σx/∂e
2 ≥ 0.
The monotonicity of e∗ with respect to r can be established by using the implicit function
theorem. From equation (A.1), we get,
∂e∗
∂r
= −
∂F (e∗,r)
∂r
∂F (e∗,r)
∂e
= −
(1 + θm)
(
− ∂E(x(χ,e∗))∂e
)
− θmb(α)∂σx∂e
(1 + θm)
[
− r ∂2E(x(χ,e∗))
∂e2
− ∂2g(e∗)
∂e2
]
− θmb(α)r∂
2σx
∂e2
; (A.2)
whose denominator is always negative as shown above and that the sign of the numerator
does not depend on r proving the claim.
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The direction of the monotonicity depends on the sign of the numerator of (A.2) . Clearly, if
the numerator is positive, then e∗ increases with r. This is the case only when
(1 + θm)
∂E(x(χ, e∗))
∂e
+ θmb(α)
∂σx
∂e
< 0,
which confirms the statement of part ii. of Lemma 1.
B Proof of Proposition 1
The optimal contract choice is given by the solution to the following problem:
max
r,d
(1 + θg)
{
λ
[
E(pe)− δ − µ]+ µ− kg(r, d ;A)}− θgb(α)λ√σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x,
s.t. (1 + θm)
[
δ − E(x(χ, e∗(r))− km(r, d ;A)− g(e∗(r))
]
− θmb(α)rσx ≥ 0.
(B.1)
The associated Lagrangian is
L = (1 + θg)
{
λ
[
E(pe)− δ − µ]+ µ− kg(r, d ;A)}− θgb(α)λ√σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x+
+ η{(1 + θm)
[
δ − E(x(χ, e∗(r))− km(r, d ;A)− g(e∗(r))
]
− θmb(α)rσx},
and the necessary first-order conditions for a maximum are:
∂L
∂r
=− (1 + θg)∂k
g
∂r
+ θgb(α)λ
[
σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x
]−1/2
(1− r)σ2x−
− η(1 + θm)
[∂km
∂r
− ∂E(x(χ, e
∗(r)))
∂e
∂e∗
∂r
− ∂g
∂e
∂e∗
∂r
]
− ηθmb(α)σx = 0, (B.2)
and
∂L
∂d
= −(1 + θg)∂k
g
∂d
− η(1 + θm)∂k
m
∂d
= 0. (B.3)
Well know results in monotone comparative statics (see Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, theorem
5) assert that if L is supermodular in (r,−d) and exhibits increasing returns in (r,−d, λ),
then the solutions to the maximization problem r(λ), and d(λ) are monotone non-decreasing
and non-increasing, respectively.
To show that our objective function, L, is supermodular in (r,−d) and exhibits increasing
differences in (r,−d, λ) it suffices to show that the cross derivatives with respect to these
three variables are non-negative (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, theorem 6). Differentiating
(B.2) with respect to −d yields
∂2L
∂r∂(−d) = (1 + θ
g)
∂2kg
∂r∂(d)
+ η(1 + θm)
∂km
∂r∂(d)
> 0, (B.4)
where the last inequality follows from the properties of kg(r, d), and the positivity of η.
Differentiation of (B.2) and (B.3) with respect to λ yields
∂2L
∂r∂λ
= θgb(α)(1− r)σ2x
[
σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x
]−1/2
> 0, and
∂2L
∂(−d)∂λ = 0, (B.5)
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respectively, which concludes our proof.
C Proof of Proposition 2
The previous proof establishes that L is supermodular in (r,−d). Differentiating the first-order
conditions (B.2) and (B.3) with respect to −Ai, and −σ2e one gets
∂2L
∂r∂(−σe) = θ
gb(α)λ(1− r)σ2x
[
σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x
]−3/2
σe > 0, and
∂2L
∂(−d)∂(−σe) = 0;
∂2L
∂r∂(−Ai) = 0, and
∂2L
∂(−d)∂(−Ai) = −(1 + θ
g)
∂2kg
∂(−d)∂(−Ai) − η(1 + θ
m)
∂km
∂(−d)∂(−Ai) > 0;
that immediately establish that L exhibits increasing differences in (r,−d,−σ2e ,−Ai), implying
that r∗ is non-increasing in σe, and Ai, while d∗ is non-decreasing in both.
Finally, differentiating (B.2) and (B.3) with respect to σχ yields
∂2L
∂r∂σx
= θgb(α)λ(1− r)σx
[
σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x
]−1/2{
2− (1− r)2σ2x
[
σ2e + (1− r)2σ2x
]−1}
− ηθmb(α),
and,
∂2L
∂(−d)∂σx = 0,
where it is apparent that it is not possible to sign in general the first cross derivative. This
completes our proof.
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Figure 1: Average contract rigidity of treatment group relative to control (1991-2001).
This figure shows the year-by-year estimated coefficient and the 90% confidence interval for rigidity of the
price adjustment mechanism in treated contracts relative to control, before and after the treatment. Contracts
are included in the treatment group if they are a new contract signed with a plant in a state which has passed
restructuring legislation. The estimating equation is based on Equation (10). Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the state the plant is located in. The vertical line indicates the first year that a state passed
restructuring legislation.
Figure 2: Average contract duration of treatment group relative to control (1991-2001).
This figure shows the year-by-year estimated coefficient and the 90% confidence interval for duration in treated
contracts relative to control, before and after the treatment. Contracts are included in the treatment group
if they are a new contract signed with a plant in a state which has passed restructuring legislation. The
estimating equation is based on Equation (11). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the state the plant
is located in. The vertical line indicates the first year that a state passed restructuring legislation.
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Figure 3: Average contract rigidity for control group (1990-2001).
This figure shows the average yearly contractual rigidity for contracts in the control group, i.e. contracts
signed by plants operating in states that have not passed restructuring legislation. The dashed line is the
estimated trend over the entire period. The vertical line indicates the first year that a state passed restructuring
legislation.
Figure 4: Average contract duration for control group (1990-2001).
This figure shows the average yearly contractual duration in years for contracts in the control group, i.e.
contracts signed by plants operating in states that have not passed restructuring legislation. The dashed line
is the estimated trend over the entire period. The vertical line indicates the first year that a state passed
restructuring legislation.
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Figure 5: Average contract rigidity of treatment group relative to control.
This figure shows the year-by-year estimated coefficient and the 90% confidence interval for duration in treated
contracts relative to control, before and after the treatment. Time is normalized relative to the year that the
state the plant is located in has passed restructuring legislation. Contracts are included in the treatment
group if they are a new contract signed with a plant in a state which has passed restructuring legislation. The
estimating equation is based on Equation (10). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the state the plant
is located in. The vertical line indicates the first year that a state passed restructuring legislation.
Figure 6: Results of the placebo test - 10,000 iterations.
(a) Rigidity (b) Duration
This figure reports the results of the Placebo test conducted assigning at each iteration half of the plants
located in regulated states to the placebo group. This procedure was repeated 10,000 times. The figure shows
the distribution of the estimated coefficients of the placebo indicator obtained from a regression of contractual
rigidity, panel (a), and duration, panel (b). The estimated equations replicate the instrumentation carried out
in Table 4, Column (3), and Table 5, Column (3), respectively.
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Figure 7: Average labour productivity of treatment group relative to control (1991-2001).
This figure shows the year-by-year estimated coefficient and the 90% confidence interval of labor productivity
(in million tons per employee), for treated counties relative to control, before and after the treatment. Counties
are included in the treatment group if at least one mine in the county has signed a new contract with a plant
in a state which has passed restructuring legislation. The estimating equation is based on Equation (12).
Standard errors are clustered at the state-county level. The vertical line indicates the first year that a state
passed restructuring legislation.
Figure 8: Average productivity for control group (1990-2001).
This figure shows the average yearly labour productivity for mines (counties) in the control group, i.e. for
counties from which no coal was shipped to any of the restructured states. The dashed line is the estimated
trend over 1990-2000. The vertical line indicates the first year that a state passed restructuring legislation.
Coal productivity dropped across the industry in 2001 as documented in U.S. EIA (2010).
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Table 1: Description of Pricing Mechanisms
Ordinal Designation Description
4, Most Rigid Fixed-Price Contract. Price is fixed over the life of the contract.
3 Base Price Plus Escalation. Different components of the price escalate
(or de-escalate) as a function of changing economic conditions (indices).
2 Price Tied to Market. Price tied to the price of coal being sold in a
particular market. Product and market area are defined in the contract.
Contract may contain a ”Most Favored Nations” clause, i.e., supplier
will not sell to any generator at a price lower than yours is paying.
2 Cost-Plus Contract with a Fixed Fee Provision. Purchaser agrees to
pay all producer’s costs plus a management fee. Some contracts
provide for payment of both a management fee and a profit. This
contract has a Fixed Fee provision.
2 Cost-Plus Contract with an Incentive Fee. Provision Purchaser agrees
to pay all producer’s costs plus a management fee. Some contracts
provide for payment of both a management fee and a profit. This
contract has an Incentive Fee provision, i.e., a variable fee that is tied
to various productivity and cost reduction incentives.
1, Least Rigid Price Renegotiation. The price is renegotiated at predetermined
intervals, usually one year. This type of contract, frequently known as
an Evergreen Contract, may also contain provisions for price
adjustments between renegotiations.
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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Table 2: Status of Electricity Restructuring
State Hearing Held Law Passed
Alabama 1997
Alaska 1998
Arizona 1995 1998
Arkansas 1997 1999
California 1994 1996
Colorado 1998
Connecticut 1994 1998
Delaware 1995 1999
District of Columbia 1996 2000
Florida 2000
Georgia 1998
Idaho 1997
Illinois 1995 1997
Indiana 1995
Iowa 1996
Kansas 1996
Kentucky 1996 1999
Louisiana 1997
Maine 1995 1997
Maryland 1995 1999
Massachusetts 1994 1997
Michigan 1994 2000
Minnesota 1997
Mississippi 1997
Missouri 1997
Montana 1996 1997
Nebraska 1996
Nevada 1994 1996
New Hampshire 1994 1996
New Jersey 1996 1999
New Mexico 1995 1999
New York 1993 1996
North Carolina 1998
North Dakota 1997
Ohio 1996 1999
Oklahoma 1995 1997
Oregon 1995 1999
Pennsylvania 1994 1996
Rhode Island 1994 1996
South Carolina 1997
South Dakota 1998
Tennessee 1997
Texas 1997 1999
Utah 1997
Vermont 1995
Virginia 1995 1999
Washington 1995
West Virginia 1995 1999
Wisconsin 1997
Wyoming 1997
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
(A) (B) (C) (D)
All Data Control Treated before Control Treated after (A)-(B) (A)-(C)
before 1996 treatment after 1996 treatment
Rigidity 3.33 3.42 3.02 3.66 3.49 7.34 -4.27
(0.79) (0.69) (0.87) (0.63) (0.63) (0.00) (0.00)
Duration 3.55 4.64 3.66 2.42 2.17 1.13 6.11
(4.45) (5.68) (4.42) (2.60) (1.49) (0.26) (0.00)
Post SO2 Regulation 0.65 0.55 0.58 0.86 0.80 2.47 -8.33
(0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.35) (0.41) (0.01) (0.00)
Post Restructuring 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.23 – –
(0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) – –
Plant in Restructured State 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 – –
(0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) – –
Previous Interaction 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.73 0.91 0.83
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.36) (0.41)
Z-Ash -0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 2.17 0.87
(0.92) (1.01) (0.88) (0.89) (0.85) (0.03) (0.39)
Z-Sulfur 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.37 0.51 2.84 -2.70
(1.04) (1.05) (0.96) (1.07) (1.12) (0.00) (0.01)
Z-Btu 0.13 0.09 0.21 0.02 0.18 -3.20 1.26
(0.60) (0.50) (0.59) (0.76) (0.50) (0.00) (0.21)
Minimum Quantity 0.49 0.58 0.37 0.61 0.32 4.36 -0.54
(0.71) (0.83) (0.54) (0.83) (0.46) (0.00) (0.59)
Appalachia Mine 0.58 0.30 0.82 0.46 0.83 -16.73 -3.82
(0.49) (0.46) (0.38) (0.50) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00)
Interior Mine 0.15 0.33 0.03 0.17 0.05 11.01 4.61
(0.36) (0.47) (0.17) (0.37) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00)
Western Mine 0.27 0.37 0.15 0.37 0.13 7.34 -0.17
(0.44) (0.48) (0.36) (0.49) (0.33) (0.00) (0.87)
Mine Dedicated Assets 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.15 2.80 0.56
(0.25) (0.27) (0.21) (0.28) (0.25) (0.01) (0.57)
Plant Dedicated Assets 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.15 3.17 0.67
(0.25) (0.27) (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.00) (0.50)
Mandatory Phase I Plant 0.32 0.39 0.25 0.29 0.42 2.26 2.48
(0.47) (0.49) (0.43) (0.45) (0.50) (0.02) (0.01)
Log of Utilization Variability 8.15 7.33 8.82 7.70 9.38 -14.10 -3.27
(1.42) (1.36) (1.13) (1.29) (0.59) (0.00) (0.00)
Time to First Renegotiation 3.34 3.57 3.66 2.87 2.46 -1.82 3.75
(3.14) (3.52) (3.31) (2.49) (2.00) (0.07) (0.00)
Mine-mouth Plant 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -1.35 2.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.05)
Log of Mine Productivity 8.80 8.67 8.67 8.89 9.00 0.10 -4.36
(0.86) (0.75) (0.92) (0.88) (0.86) (0.92) (0.00)
Injuries Per Worker 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.66 2.32
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.15) (0.51) (0.02)
Continuous Production 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.53 2.27 3.09
(0.28) (0.27) (0.24) (0.31) (0.26) (0.02) (0.00)
Underground Mine 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.27 -1.65 0.14
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.10) (0.89)
Sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses).
See Sections 4.2, 5.1, and 5.2 for detailed descriptions of all data series, including sources.
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Table 4: Contract Choice – Rigidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ordered Probit IV-Oprobit IV End. Matching 3SLS
Duration -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.04* -0.10*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Post Restructuring 0.27* 0.27* 0.29*** 0.34** 0.20***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) (0.07)
Plant in Restructured State -0.54** -0.54** -0.39*** -0.49** -0.35***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.12) (0.23) (0.06)
Previous Interaction 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.11 -0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)
Post SO2 Regulation -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06)
Mandatory Phase I Plant 0.33*** 0.34** 0.17*** 0.28** 0.22***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.05)
Z-Ash 0.07 0.07 0.06** 0.07 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Z-Sulfur 0.08* 0.08* 0.04 0.08* 0.05***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Z-Btu -0.23* -0.23* -0.14** -0.24** -0.12***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.04)
Underground Mine -0.32 -0.32 -0.17 -0.28 -0.19**
(0.21) (0.22) (0.11) (0.21) (0.09)
Interior Mine 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.31 0.15**
(0.26) (0.26) (0.14) (0.26) (0.06)
Western Mine 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.28*** 0.44*** 0.28***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.09) (0.17) (0.06)
Log of Utilization Variability 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.02)
Year Signed 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.02 0.02*** 0.02*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant – – -32.27 – -33.65
– – (29.61) – (21.23)
Observations 1051 1191 1022 1201 1022
R-squared 0.16 – 0.23 – 0.23
Test for instruments’ relevance – 51.99 12.51 51.19 172.67
p-value – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance, respectively. Time period for all
regressions is 1990-2001. (1)-(4): Standard errors corrected for State-level serial correlation in parentheses.
In (2)-(5), the Instruments for Duration are: Mine Dedicated Assets, Plant Dedicated Assets, Minimum
Quantity, and Multiple Mode of Delivery. In (3) and (5), Rigidity is treated as a continuous variable.
In (3)Hansen’s test fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid (J-test=5.54, p-value=0.14),
the model passes the Kleinbergen-Paap under-identification test (LM statistic=15.09, p-value=0.00); the
Kleinbergen-Paap Wald test for weak identification is 10.64. In (4), the matching equation specifies the
Log of Utilization Variability as a function of Interior, Western Mine, and State dummies, as well as State
dummies interactions with Z-Ash, Z-Sulfur, Z-Btu, and Underground Mine; the F -test for the matching
equation is 54.94 (p-value=0.00), the adjusted R2 is 0.85.
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Table 5: Contract Choice – Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV 3SLS
Rigidity -1.10*** -2.55*** -3.45*** -2.42***
(0.27) (0.64) (1.04) (0.54)
Post Restructuring 0.45 0.70* 0.65 0.65
(0.39) (0.33) (0.47) (0.43)
Plant in Restructured State -0.39 -1.25*** -1.33** -0.99***
(0.43) (0.43) (0.59) (0.35)
Previous Interaction -0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.02
(0.19) (0.17) (0.24) (0.24)
Post SO2 Regulation 12.27*** 12.30*** 10.78*** 11.39***
(2.28) (2.20) (2.67) (1.08)
Mandatory Phase I Plant 0.73** 0.84*** 1.20*** 0.98***
(0.36) (0.25) (0.34) (0.27)
Mine Dedicated Assets 0.99** 0.96*** 0.75* 0.96**
(0.39) (0.27) (0.44) (0.43)
Plant Dedicated Assets -0.81 -0.48 -0.65 -0.67
(0.58) (0.49) (0.59) (0.44)
Multiple Mode of Delivery 0.66* 0.69** 0.92** 0.29
(0.35) (0.30) (0.39) (0.23)
Minimum Quantity 2.20*** 1.83*** 2.11*** 2.09***
(0.55) (0.43) (0.62) (0.18)
Constant 7.05*** 11.87*** 14.67*** 11.57***
(1.17) (2.35) (3.67) (1.81)
Observations 1048 1022 1034 1022
R-squared 0.36 0.31 0.22 0.32
Test for instruments’ relevance – 4.34 12.00 24.63
p-value – 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance, respectively.
Time period for all regressions is 1990-2001. Vintage dummies are included in all
regressions. (1)-(3): Standard errors corrected for State-level serial correlation in
parentheses. In (2), the instruments for Rigidity are: Z-Ash, Z-Sulfur, Z-Btu,
Underground Mine, Interior Mine, Western Mine, Log of Utilization Variability;
in this model, Hansen’s test fails to reject the null that the instruments are
valid (J-test=7.73, p-value=0.26), the model passes both the Kleinbergen-Paap
under-identification test (LM statistic=12.17, p-value=0.08); the Cragg-Donald
Wald test for weak identification is 12.86. In (3), the only instrument for Rigidity
is Western Mine; the model passes both the Kleinbergen-Paap under-identification
test (LM statistic=8.55, p-value=0.00) and the Cragg-Donald Wald test for weak
identification (F -test=36.68).
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Table 6: Test of Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
(1) (2) (3)
Ordered Probit IV-Oprobit IV
Duration -0.10**** -0.02*** -0.08**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Mine Selling to Both Plant Types 0.08 -0.02 -0.01
(0.15) (0.10) (0.05)
Previous Interaction 0.25* 0.08 0.09
(0.14) (0.05) (0.07)
Post SO2 Regulation -0.04 -0.03 0.02
(0.14) (0.06) (0.06)
Mandatory Phase I Plant 0.205* 0.12 0.1
(0.16) (0.12) (0.09)
Z-Ash 0.08 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Z-Sulfur 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Z-Btu -0.15 -0.04 -0.08**
(0.09) (0.05) (0.04)
Underground Mine -0.51** -0.22 -0.25**
(0.25) (0.14) (0.12)
Interior Mine 0.30 0.09 0.01
(0.24) (0.19) (0.12)
Western Mine 0.43*** 0.23*** 0.15**
(0.14) (0.09) (0.06)
Log of Utilization Variability 0.04 0.01 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Year Signed 0.05*** 0.03** 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant – -57.89** -6.22
– (24.38) (24.23)
Observations 565.00 635.00 548.00
R-squared – – 0.17
Test for instruments’ relevance – 57.27 12.69
p-value – 0.00 0.00
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance, respectively.
Time period for all regressions is 1990-2001. Standard errors corrected for
State-level serial correlation in parentheses. In (2)-(3), the Instruments for
Duration are: Mine Dedicated Assets, Plant Dedicated Assets, and Minimum
Quantity. In (3), Rigidity is treated as a continuous variable, Duration as
not truncated; in this model Hansen’s test fails to reject the null that the
instruments are valid (J-test=0.42, p-value=0.81), the model passes both the
Kleinbergen-Paap underidentification test (LM statistic=10.56, p-value=0.01)
and the Cragg-Donald Wald test for weak identification (F -test=23.08).
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Table 7: Mine Productivity
Fixed Effects
Labour Productivity
Coal to Restructured State 1050.91*
(561.85)
Injuries per worker 2802.69
(1958.89)
(Injuries per worker)2 -1166.76*
(613.93)
Continuous Production 10165.93***
(1897.71)
(Continuous Production)2 -7396.56***
(1729.96)
Constant 4466.87***
(596.87)
Observations 2159
Groups 240
R2 0.04
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statis-
tical significance, respectively. Time period is 1990-
2001.Standard errors clustered at the county-state level
in parentheses. Year dummies are included but not
shown. The average productivity, short tons per em-
ployee, is 9186 throughout the sample, so the increase
in productivity due to sales to plants in restructured
states is 11.4 %.
Table 8: Average productivity of continuing and discontinuing
mines (short tons/employee 1991-1995).
Year Continuing (A) Discontinuing (B) t-statistic Pr(A−B > 0)
1990 7366.82 6980.24 0.40 0.35
1991 7293.20 7019.98 0.28 0.39
1992 7748.92 7563.48 0.18 0.43
1993 8646.62 7703.35 0.83 0.21
1994 9606.38 8499.53 0.82 0.21
1995 10169.09 8525.49 1.16 0.13
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Table 9: Contract Renegotiations
Poisson
Time to Renegotiation
Rigidity -0.19***
(0.02)
Duration 0.03***
(0.01)
Post Restructuring -0.03
(0.05)
Mine-mouth Plant 0.36*
(0.21)
Constant 1.96***
(0.10)
Observations 1,826
Psuedo R2 0.12
Notes: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1%
statistical significance, respectively. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Time period is 1990-
2001. Vintage dummies included but not shown.
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